HAPPY INDEPENDENCE DAY  JULY 4,2022

The Founding Fathers of the United States were directed as well as inspired by God in the creation and writing of the United States Constitution. Over the 220 plus years that the constitution has existed the constitution has undergone many changes. To distinguish the original constitution from the constitution that the United States is governed by today we will call the original document the Founding Fathers Constitution. Yet the SCOTUS FAILED  the interpretation of the original constitution by allowing party lines to influence their decisions.

"EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW"-These words, written above the main entrance to the Supreme Court Building, express the ultimate responsibility of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court is the highest tribunal in the Nation for all cases and controversies arising under the Constitution or the laws of the United States. As the final arbiter of the law, the Court is charged with ensuring the American people the promise of equal justice under law and, thereby, also functions as guardian and interpreter of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court is "distinctly American in concept and function," as Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes observed. Few other courts in the world have the same authority of constitutional interpretation and none have exercised it for as long or with as much influence. A century and a half ago, the French political observer Alexis de Tocqueville noted the unique position of the Supreme Court in the history of nations and of jurisprudence. "The representative system of government has been adopted in several states of Europe," he remarked, "but I am unaware that any nation of the globe has hitherto organized a judicial power in the same manner as the Americans. . . . A more imposing judicial power was never constituted by any people."

The unique position of the Supreme Court stems, in large part, from the deep commitment of the American people to the Rule of Law and to constitutional government. The United States has demonstrated an unprecedented determination to preserve and protect its written Constitution, thereby providing the American "experiment in democracy" with the oldest written Constitution still in force.

The Constitution of the United States is a carefully balanced document. It is designed to provide for a national government sufficiently strong and flexible to meet the needs of the republic, yet sufficiently limited and just to protect the guaranteed rights of citizens; it permits a balance between society’s need for order and the individual’s right to freedom. To assure these ends, the Framers of the Constitution created three independent and coequal branches of government. That this Constitution has provided continuous democratic government through the periodic stresses of more than two centuries illustrates the genius of the American system of government.

The complex role of the Supreme Court in this system derives from its authority to invalidate legislation or executive actions which, in the Court’s considered judgment, conflict with the Constitution. This power of "judicial review" has given the Court a crucial responsibility in assuring individual rights, as well as in maintaining a "living Constitution" whose broad provisions are continually applied to complicated new situations.

While the function of judicial review is not explicitly provided in the Constitution, it had been anticipated before the adoption of that document. Prior to 1789, state courts had already overturned legislative acts which conflicted with state constitutions. Moreover, many of the Founding Fathers expected the Supreme Court to assume this role in regard to the Constitution; Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, for example, had underlined the importance of judicial review in the Federalist Papers, which urged adoption of the Constitution.

Hamilton had written that through the practice of judicial review the Court ensured that the will of the whole people, as expressed in their Constitution, would be supreme over the will of a legislature, whose statutes might express only the temporary will of part of the people. And Madison had written that constitutional interpretation must be left to the reasoned judgment of independent judges, rather than to the tumult and conflict of the political process. If every constitutional question were to be decided by public political bargaining, Madison argued, the Constitution would be reduced to a battleground of competing factions, political passion and partisan spirit.

Despite this background the Court’s power of judicial review was not confirmed until 1803, when it was invoked by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison. In this decision, the Chief Justice asserted that the Supreme Court's responsibility to overturn unconstitutional legislation was a necessary consequence of its sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. That oath could not be fulfilled any other way. "It is emphatically the province of the judicial department to say what the law is," he declared.

In retrospect, it is evident that constitutional interpretation and application were made necessary by the very nature of the Constitution. The Founding Fathers had wisely worded that document in rather general terms leaving it open to future elaboration to meet changing conditions. As Chief Justice Marshall noted in McCulloch v. Maryland, a constitution that attempted to detail every aspect of its own application "would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. . . . Its nature, therefore, requires that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves."

The Constitution limits the Court to dealing with "Cases" and "Controversies." John Jay, the first Chief Justice, clarified this restraint early in the Court’s history by declining to advise President George Washington on the constitutional implications of a proposed foreign policy decision. The Court does not give advisory opinions; rather, its function is limited only to deciding specific cases.

The Justices must exercise considerable discretion in deciding which cases to hear, since approximately 7,000-8,000 civil and criminal cases are filed in the Supreme Court each year from the various state and federal courts. The Supreme Court also has "original jurisdiction" in a very small number of cases arising out of disputes between States or between a State and the Federal Government.

When the Supreme Court rules on a constitutional issue, that judgment is virtually final; its decisions can be altered only by the rarely used procedure of constitutional amendment or by a new ruling of the Court. However, when the Court interprets a statute, new legislative action can be taken.

Chief Justice Marshall expressed the challenge which the Supreme Court faces in maintaining free government by noting: "We must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding . . . intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs."

The U. S. Founding Fathers were provided with a unique perspective that few people in history have experienced firsthand that is living under both extremes of government rule. The authority of a tyrannical government as well as living under an ineffectual government charter with insufficient powers to govern. Initially life under the King George III of England was acceptable. In fact, most of the people enjoyed life under the authority of the King of England. As time passed grievances arose that the King was unable or unwilling to address. The King’s unwillingness to correct the problems encountered by the colonists mounted till corrections had to be made. The King refusing to address the problems worsened the situation for the colonists by adding additional laws, tariffs and taxes onto the backs of the colonists. A once loved King George III became a tyrannical leader. The U. S. Founding Fathers attempted to redress the situation through every legal avenue they had available. This eventually led to a hardening of positions on both sides which in turn led to the Revolutionary War.

Life under an Ineffective Government Charter

The colonies after cutting ties with England established a charter the Articles of Confederation to administer the duties, obligations of the thirteen colonies as well as conducting the war. The Articles of Confederation were found to be ineffective not providing sufficient authority to the central government. The Articles of Confederation were dependent upon the colonies relinquishing authority over their territory. The colonists as well as their colonial governments were unwilling to give the central government sufficient authority to effectively govern the thirteen colonies. In spite of these deficiencies the Colonists were able to win the Revolutionary War. George Washington credited the colonies performance in the war to acts of Providence. The colonists lived several years under the limited authority of the central government governing using the Articles of Confederation charter. This allowed the colonists to understand the disadvantages of life under a government that did not possess sufficient authority to effectively rule. Living under these two extremes the Founding Fathers knew the disadvantages of both governmental entities. The Founding Fathers historical experience allowed them to create a comprehensive document designed to protect the rights of the people.

The Founding Father’s Constitution

Life under the rule of the King taught the colonists to fear absolute control. Whereas life under the charter of the Articles of Confederation taught the Founders that a central government must have certain powers and authority to be able to govern properly. Faced with these two opposing positions the U. S. Founding Fathers undertook the creation of the United States Constitution.

Checks and Balances

The Founders were fearful that a central government over time would increase its authority and control over the people established sets of checks and balances to limit the ability of the central government to morph into a tyrannical government without the approval of the States and the people. To protect the rights and freedom of the people checks and balances were established. Thomas Jefferson believed that the government at the State level, being closer to the people, would provide the people with greater representation. By balancing the authority of the national government with the combined powers of the States the powers of the national government are limited. In this manner the powers of the Federal government are balanced between the States and the Federal or central government. Though the power of the Federal government was now balanced the Founding Fathers were still fearful that the central government could still develop into a tyrannical government body. Further checks were established to limit and restrict the ability of the central government from acquiring additional authority and power over the people. Among the checks three entities of the national government established branches with specific duties and responsibilities. Each branch had VETO authority over the other branches. The bi-camel congress was given separate distinct responsibilities. A bi-camel congress was established to represent their segment of the controlling government bodies. The Senate was to defend the State’s rights whereas the House of Representatives were to represent the people. It is this VETO authority that provides the checks to an out-of-control Federal government.

States Rights

The Federal government’s authority and powers are derived directly from the States. The States were placed between the Federal government and the people. In this way the States are a “Wall of Political Protection” protecting the rights and freedom of the people. To accomplish this control authority the States were provided with Senators that would be under direct control of their State legislature. The U. S. Senators were to report directly to their State legislature to determine the response the Senators should or should not take at the Federal level of government. The U. S. Senators were appointed by their States legislature. The Senators were subject to the dictates of their particular State’s legislature. In this way the States could protect the States authority as well as protect the freedom of its citizenry from infringing power of the Federal government. The House of Representatives was established to represent and protect the people of their state. The House Representatives were elected by their state’s registered voters. The House Representatives served subject to the dictates of the people.

Founding Fathers

The Founding Fathers established the separation of powers along with the redundancy of checks and balances so that the unalienable rights and freedom of the people could be adequately protected. The Founders were so fearful of the possibility that the central government would morph over time to become tyrannical that the Bill of Rights was added to the Founding Fathers constitution. The Bill of Rights established the specific restrictions dictating the limits that were to be placed on the Federal government. It was only with the addition of the Bill of Rights to the constitution that all the Founders got on board willing to accept the Founding Fathers constitution as the official governing document. The Founders constitution was completed in 1787 and enacted in into the law of the land in 1789.     

 

Strategy Details War Plan to stop Russia and China

Image: AP

NATO was facing rebukes from Moscow and Beijing on Thursday after it declared Russia a “direct threat” and said China posed “serious challenges ” to global stability.

The Western military alliance was wrapping up a summit in Madrid, where it issued a stark warning that the world has been plunged into a dangerous phase of big-power competition and myriad threats, from cyberattacks to climate change.

NATO leaders also formally invited Finland and Sweden to join the alliance, after overcoming opposition from Turkey. If the Nordic nations' accession is approved by the 30 member nations, it will give NATO a new 800-mile (1,300 kilometer) border with Russia.

Russian President Vladimir Putin warned he would respond in kind if the Nordic nations allowed NATO troops and military infrastructure onto their territory. He said Russia will have to “create the same threats for the territory from which threats against us are created.” China accused the alliance of “maliciously attacking and smearing” the country. Its mission to the European Union said NATO “claims that other countries pose challenges, but it is NATO that is creating problems around the world.” Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg told the summit that Russia's invasion of Ukraine had brought “the biggest overhaul of our collective defense since the end of the Cold War.” The invasion shattered Europe's peace, and in response NATO has poured troops and weapons into eastern Europe on a scale unseen in decades. Member nations have given Ukraine billions in military and civilian aid to strengthen its resistance.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who addressed the summit by video link, asked for more. He urged NATO to send modern artillery systems and other weapons and warned the leaders they either had to provide Kyiv with the help it needed or “face a delayed war between Russia and yourself.” “The question is, who's next? Moldova? Or the Baltics? Or Poland? The answer is: all of them,” he said.

At the summit, NATO leaders agreed to dramatically scale up military force along the alliance's eastern flank, where countries from Romania to the Baltic states worry about Russia's future plans.

It announced plans to increase almost eightfold the size of the alliance's rapid reaction force, from 40,000 to 300,000 troops, by next year. The troops will be based in their home nations but dedicated to specific countries in the east, where the alliance plans to build up stocks of equipment and ammunition.

President Joe Biden, whose country provides the bulk of NATO's firepower, announced a hefty boost in America's military presence in Europe, including a permanent U.S. base in Poland, two more Navy destroyers based in Rota, Spain, and two more F35 squadrons to the U.K.

The expansion will keep 100,000 troops in Europe for the foreseeable future, up from 80,000 before the war in Ukraine began.

Biden said Putin had believed NATO members would splinter after he invaded Ukraine, but he got the opposite response.

“Putin was looking for the Finland-ization of Europe,” Biden said. “You're gonna get the NATO-ization of Europe. And that's exactly what he didn't want, but exactly what needs to be done to guarantee security for Europe.” Still, strains among NATO allies have also emerged as the cost of energy and other essential goods has skyrocketed, partly because of the war and tough Western sanctions on Russia. There also are tensions over how the war will end and what, if any, concessions Ukraine should make.

Money remains a sensitive issue — just nine of NATO's 30 members currently meet the organization's target of spending 2% of gross domestic product on defense.

At what Stoltenberg called a “transformative” summit, the leaders published NATO's new Strategic Concept, its once-a-decade set of priorities and goals.

The last such document, in 2010, called Russia a “strategic partner.” Now, NATO is accusing Russia of using “coercion, subversion, aggression and annexation” to extend its reach.

The 2010 document made no mention of China, but the new one addressed Bejing's growing economic and military reach.

“China is not our adversary, but we must be clear-eyed about the serious challenges it represents,” Stoltenberg said on Wednesday.

NATO said that China “strives to subvert the rules-based international order, including in the space, cyber and maritime domains” and warned of its close ties with Moscow.

The alliance said, however, that it remained “open to constructive engagement” with Beijing.

China shot back that NATO was a source of instability and vowed to defend its interests.

“Since NATO positions China as a systemic challenge,' we have to pay close attention and respond in a coordinated way. When it comes to acts that undermine China's interests, we will make firm and strong responses,” its statement said.

NATO also stressed the need to address political instability in Africa's Sahel region and the Middle East — aggravated by “climate change, fragile institutions, health emergencies and food insecurity” — that is driving large numbers of migrants toward Europe. Host Spain and other European countries pushed for this new focus.

NATO is putting Russia and any other “nuclear-armed peer-competitors” on notice that the trans-Atlantic alliance can and will retaliate against any nuclear attack.

The latest edition of the security bloc’s guiding strategic concept evinces a more muscular posture regarding NATO’s nuclear forces than the 2010 document, which characterized Russia as a “partner” just four years before the Kremlin seized Crimea from Ukraine. And the latest document implies that as North Atlantic allies send a stronger signal about threats from Russia’s nuclear threats, they also won’t fail to keep an eye on China’s nuclear arsenal.

“We have a wartime strategic concept, actually, not a peacetime one, so [we] want to use stronger language,” a senior European official told the Washington Examiner.

The balance of nuclear military power emerged as a burning issue in the last several months, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has invoked Moscow’s arsenal to deter at least some Western support or intervention for Ukraine. His nuclear saber-rattling has spurred some European officials to wonder if Putin thinks he could win a limited nuclear war; the allies, for their part, asserted such a conflict would be a losing proposition for their enemies.

BIDEN ANNOUNCES PERMANENT BASE IN POLAND, STRENGTHENING OF NATO’S EASTERN FLANK

“The circumstances in which NATO might have to use nuclear weapons are extremely remote,” the Strategic Concept reads. “Any employment of nuclear weapons against NATO would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict. The Alliance has the capabilities and resolve to impose costs on an adversary that would be unacceptable and far outweigh the benefits that any adversary could hope to achieve.”

That’s a more forceful warning than the analogous section of the 2010 document, in which the alliance emphasized that "circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote.” The revision also placed more emphasis on France and the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons in an apparent effort to signal that the threat of nuclear retaliation for a Russian nuclear attack wouldn’t depend solely on an American president.

"The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance,” the 2022 document now reads. “These Allies’ separate centers of decision-making contribute to deterrence by complicating the calculations of potential adversaries.”

The new document also shows more fundamental shifts in the strategic outlook of the allies. In 2010, NATO leaders could agree that “the alliance does not consider any country to be its adversary” and identified “the proliferation of ballistic missiles” as the most salient “real and growing threat to the Euro-Atlantic area” — an apparent reference to Iran’s non-nuclear military capabilities.

Where the arms control section of the 2010 concept could thus declare that "NATO seeks its security at the lowest possible level of [nuclear] forces,” now the allies see a need to deter multiple nuclear powers.

“We will individually and collectively deliver the full range of forces, capabilities, plans, resources, assets and infrastructure needed for deterrence and defense, including for high-intensity, multi-domain warfighting against nuclear-armed peer-competitors,” the new document reads.

The allies made their misgivings about Beijing’s nuclear weapons explicit elsewhere in this year's concept document. “The PRC is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal and is developing increasingly sophisticated delivery systems, without increasing transparency or engaging in good faith in arms control or risk reduction,” NATO said.

The U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard have released a new, overarching tri-service strategy document for how they plan to project maritime power together going forward. The document focuses heavily on how the three services expect to fight on the high seas and adjacent areas on land. However, there is also a very important underlying discussion about adopting a more assertive approach to responding to day-to-day challenges, especially from China, and to a lesser extent, Russia, among other potential adversaries, that are short of a shooting war.

The three services unveiled their new "integrated" strategy, titled "Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power," on Dec. 17, 2020. The document includes discussions about of a number of concepts of operation that the trio has been openly discussing, such as a greater focus on distributed operations leveraging a dramatically reorganized Marine Corps riding on smaller amphibious warfare ships, the increased use of unmanned aircraft and naval platforms, and distributed sensor and communications networks. There is also a "renewed emphasis on fighting for and gaining sea control" in light of growing concerns about a potential higher-end future naval fight with a major adversary, such as China or Russia.

In consultation with the intelligence community, U.S. military planners identify events that should be used for planning the size and mix of U.S. forces. There is a tension, however, between planning for the most likely situations as opposed to worst-case events. For example, large-scale, high-intensity conflicts like China invading Taiwan or Russia invading Latvia would be challenging for U.S. and allied militaries but are less likely compared to scenarios such as protracted gray-zone confrontations between China or Russia and their neighbors. U.S. planners usually choose high-intensity scenarios, although protracted conflicts may be harder for the U.S. military to address.

After the scenario subjects are decided, planners build a detailed description of the events leading up to the conflict, the expected actions of adversary, allied, and noncombatant governments and militaries, and the order of battle expected to be employed by each participating nation. Scenarios usually do not detail U.S. government or military actions.

Explain the conceptual framework in designing scenarios for non-conventional conflict.


Non-conventional conflicts are those that do not involve sustained combat between regular armed forces. Examples include insurgencies by militia forces being supported by a state aggressor, such as in Ukraine; harassment of opposing government and commercial activities in international airspace or waters, as in the East and South China Seas; or a de facto blockade of a disputed territory using militia, law enforcement, and civilian forces like that around the Senkaku Islands.

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) plans for these events, but they are low priority. However, because they are less intense than traditional scenarios like invasions, non-conventional confrontations can be sustained longer by the aggressor and employ a wide range of proxy, civilian, and paramilitary forces that create challenges for the U.S. military. The predominance of large, highly capable units in U.S. forces makes protracted campaigns potentially unaffordable and reduces U.S. options at lower levels of escalation. As a result, the U.S. government can be portrayed as the aggressor in a non-conventional conflict because the forces it employs are disproportionate for the situation.Identify fundamental assumptions about how the U.S. might engage in conventional and non-conventional contest with China or Russia and explain how these assumptions should be tested in scenario risk analysis.

The DoD has evolved a strong set of assumptions regarding conventional conflicts. The U.S. military generally assumes it will not be the aggressor and will have some, potentially short, warning that will allow the mobilization of forces to the conflict area. Forces already deployed respond to aggression and attempt to delay or deny the enemy’s success while preparing for the arrival of additional forces from adjacent theaters or the continental United States.

The U.S. military has a less coherent view regarding non-conventional conflict. Because these scenarios occur below the level of armed combat, U.S. military forces are often not an appropriate response, but the U.S. government does not continuously deploy law enforcement forces like the Coast Guard or paramilitary units like contractors – although Coast Guard deployments to the Western Pacific are rising. The use of conventional forces is episodic and limited to shows of force, exercises, or freedom of navigation operations rather than directly countering the non-conventional aggression.

What are key challenges and opportunities for U.S. military planners in preparing for potential military confrontation involving China or Russia?

China and Russia are difficult to plan against because they pose multidimensional challenges in areas close to their own territory. Both countries established extensive sensor networks using radar, electronic intelligence, and space imagery around their territory that can be used for surveillance and targeting of a large inventory and variety of precision ballistic and cruise missiles. Their sensor and weapon networks give China and Russia the ability to conduct rapid, large-scale attacks in regions they have interests such as the East and South China Seas for China and Eastern Europe for Russia.

In a conventional conflict, Chinese or Russian missiles give their militaries the ability to delay U.S. reinforcements while quickly attacking U.S. allies to coerce them into submission. In a non-conventional conflict, China and Russia can threaten U.S. military forces and force U.S. commanders to either send in small units at high risk or employ larger units that can defend themselves but are disproportionate for the non-conventional confrontation. As evidenced by the success of Chinese or Russian gray-zone operations over the last decade, the U.S. government has not determined a satisfactory non-conventional response.

How should the new U.S. administration align defense spending allocation with emerging non-conventional threats?

The U.S. government will need a larger number of units that are smaller and less expensive to buy and maintain compared to today’s U.S. military. Less heavily-armed units such as Littoral Combat Ships, Coast Guard cutters, or company-size National Guard formations would be more proportional in non-conventional confrontations against Russian-supported proxy forces or People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia ships. These units would also be affordable enough to buy and operate in large enough numbers so they can sustain a robust presence in contested areas for a protracted periods.

Top US military commanders explained the new tactics to Congress in March in a series of budget hearings. The commandant of the US Marine Corps, Gen. David Berger, told the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 5 that small units of Marines armed with precision missiles could assist the US Navy to gain control of the seas, particularly in the Western Pacific.

"The Tomahawk missile is one of the tools that is going to allow us to do that," he said.

The Tomahawk — which first gained fame when launched in massed strikes during the 1991 Gulf War — has been carried on US warships and used to attack land targets in recent decades. The Marines would test fire the cruise missile through 2022 with the aim of making it operational the following year, top Pentagon commanders testified.

At first, a relatively small number of land-based cruise missiles will not change the balance of power. But such a shift would send a strong political signal that Washington is preparing to compete with China's massive arsenal, according to senior US and other Western strategists.

Guided missile cruiser USS Cape St. George launches a Tomahawk Land Attack Missile in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, March 23, 2003. US Navy/Intelligence Specialist 1st Class Kenneth Moll

Longer term, bigger numbers of these weapons combined with similar Japanese and Taiwanese missiles would pose a serious threat to Chinese forces, they say. The biggest immediate threat to the PLA comes from new, long-range anti-ship missiles now entering service with US Navy and Air Force strike aircraft.

"The Americans are coming back strongly," said Ross Babbage, a former senior Australian government defense official and now a non-resident fellow at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a security research group. "By 2024 or 2025 there is a serious risk for the PLA that their military developments will be obsolete."

A Chinese military spokesman, Senior Col. Wu Qian, warned last October that Beijing would "not stand by" if Washington deployed land-based, long-range missiles in the Asia-Pacific region. China's foreign ministry accused the United States of sticking "to its Cold War mentality" and "constantly increasing military deployment" in the region.

"Recently, the United States has gotten worse, stepping up its pursuit of a so-called 'Indo-Pacific strategy' that seeks to deploy new weapons, including ground-launched intermediate-range missiles, in the Asia-Pacific region," the ministry said in a statement to Reuters. "China firmly opposes that."
US military unshackled
Royal Australian Navy guided-missile frigate HMAS Parramatta, left, with US Navy amphibious assault ship USS America, Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Bunker Hill, and Arleigh-Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Barry in the South China Sea, April 18, 2020. US Navy/MCS 3rd Class Nicholas Huynh via REUTERS

While the coronavirus pandemic rages, Beijing has increased its military pressure on Taiwan and exercises in the South China Sea.

In a show of strength, on April 11 the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning led a flotilla of five other warships into the Western Pacific through the Miyako Strait to the northeast of Taiwan, according to Taiwan's Defense Ministry. On April 12, the Chinese warships exercised in waters east and south of Taiwan, the ministry said.

Meanwhile, the US Navy was forced to tie up the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt at Guam while it battles to contain a coronavirus outbreak among the crew of the giant warship. However, the US Navy managed to maintain a powerful presence off the Chinese coast.


The guided-missile destroyer USS Barry passed through the Taiwan Strait twice in April. And the amphibious assault ship USS America last month exercised in the East China Sea and South China Sea, the US Indo-Pacific Command said.

In a series last year, Reuters reported that while the US was distracted by almost two decades of war in the Middle East and Afghanistan, the PLA had built a missile force designed to attack the aircraft carriers, other surface warships and network of bases that form the backbone of American power in Asia. Over that period, Chinese shipyards built the world's biggest navy, which is now capable of dominating the country's coastal waters and keeping US forces at bay.

The series also revealed that in most categories, China's missiles now rival or outperform counterparts in the armories of the US alliance.
A float carrying a portrait of Chinese President Xi Jinping in Tiananmen Square during the parade marking the 70th founding anniversary of People's Republic of China, on its National Day in Beijing, October 1, 2019. REUTERS/Thomas Peter

China derived an advantage because it was not party to a Cold War-era treaty — the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) — that banned the United States and Russia from possessing ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges from 500 kilometers to 5,500 kilometers. Unrestrained by the INF pact, China has deployed about 2,000 of these weapons, according to US and other Western estimates.


While building up its missile forces on land, the PLA also fitted powerful, long-range anti-ship missiles to its warships and strike aircraft.

This accumulated firepower has shifted the regional balance of power in China's favor. The United States, long the dominant military power in Asia, can no longer be confident of victory in a military clash in waters off the Chinese coast, according to senior retired US military officers.

But the decision by President Donald Trump last year to exit the INF treaty has given American military planners new leeway. Almost immediately after withdrawing from the pact on August 2, the administration signaled it would respond to China's missile force. The next day, US Secretary for Defense Mark Esper said he would like to see ground-based missiles deployed in Asia within months, but he acknowledged it would take longer.

Later that month, the Pentagon tested a ground-launched Tomahawk cruise missile. In December, it tested a ground-launched ballistic missile. The INF treaty banned such ground-launched weapons, and thus both tests would have been forbidden.

The Defense Department tests a conventionally configured ground-launched cruise missile at San Nicolas Island, California, August 18, 2019. DoD photo by Scott Howe

A senior Marines commander, Lt. Gen. Eric Smith, told the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 11 that the Pentagon leadership had instructed the Marines to field a ground-launched cruise missile "very quickly."

The budget documents show that the Marines have requested $125 million to buy 48 Tomahawk missiles from next year. The Tomahawk has a range of 1,600km, according to its manufacturer, Raytheon Company.

Smith said the cruise missile may not ultimately prove to be the most suitable weapon for the Marines. "It may be a little too heavy for us," he told the Senate Armed Services Committee, but experience gained from the tests could be transferred to the army.

Smith also said the Marines had successfully tested a new shorter-range anti-ship weapon, the Naval Strike Missile, from a ground launcher and would conduct another test in June. He said if that test was successful, the Marines intended to order 36 of these missiles in 2022.

Naval Strike Missile launch from USS Coronado (LCS-4) in September 2014. US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Zachary D. Bell

The US Army is also testing a new long-range, land-based missile that can target warships. This missile would have been prohibited under the INF treaty.

The Marine Corps said in a statement it was evaluating the Naval Strike Missile to target ships and the Tomahawk for attacking targets on land. Eventually, the Marines aimed to field a system "that could engage long-range moving targets either on land or sea," the statement said.

The Defense Department also has research underway on new, long-range strike weapons, with a budget request of $3.2 billion for hypersonic technology, mostly for missiles.

China's foreign ministry drew a distinction between the PLA's arsenal of missiles and the planned US deployment.


It said China's missiles were "located in its territory, especially short and medium-range missiles, which cannot reach the mainland of the United States. This is fundamentally different from the US, which is vigorously pushing forward deployment."
Bottling up China's navy
Liaoning, China's first aircraft carrier REUTERS/Bobby Yip

Military strategists James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara suggested almost a decade ago that the first island chain was a natural barrier that could be exploited by the American military to counter the Chinese naval build-up. Ground-based anti-ship missiles could command key passages through the island chain into the Western Pacific as part of a strategy to keep the rapidly expanding Chinese navy bottled up, they suggested.

In embracing this strategy, Washington is attempting to turn Chinese tactics back on the PLA. Senior US commanders have warned that China's land-based cruise and ballistic missiles would make it difficult for US and allied navies to operate near China's coastal waters.

But deploying ground-based US and allied missiles in the island chain would pose a similar threat to Chinese warships — to vessels operating in the South China Sea, East China Sea and Yellow Sea, or ships attempting to break out into the Western Pacific. Japan and Taiwan have already deployed ground-based anti-ship missiles for this purpose.


"We need to be able to plug up the straits," said Holmes, a professor at the US Naval War College. "We can, in effect, ask them if they want Taiwan or the Senkakus badly enough to see their economy and armed forces cut off from the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. In all likelihood the answer will be no."

Holmes was referring to the uninhabited group of isles in the East China Sea — known as the Senkaku islands in Japan and the Diaoyu islands in China — that are claimed by both Tokyo and Beijing.
The approximate boundaries of the first and second island chains in the western Pacific. US Defense Department

The United States faces challenges in plugging the first island chain. Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte's decision to distance himself from the United States and forge closer ties with China is a potential obstacle to American plans. US forces could face barriers to operating from strategically important islands in the Philippines archipelago after Duterte in February scrapped a key security agreement with Washington.

And if US forces do deploy in the first island chain with anti-ship missiles, some US strategists believe this won't be decisive, as the Marines would be vulnerable to strikes from the Chinese military.


The United States has other counterweights. The firepower of long-range US Air Force bombers could pose a bigger threat to Chinese forces than the Marines, the strategists said. Particularly effective, they said, could be the stealthy B-21 bomber, which is due to enter service in the middle of this decade, armed with long-range missiles.

The Pentagon is already moving to boost the firepower of its existing strike aircraft in Asia. US Navy Super Hornet jets and Air Force B-1 bombers are now being armed with early deliveries of Lockheed Martin's new Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, according to the budget request documents.

The new missile is being deployed in response to an "urgent operational need" for the US Pacific Command, the documents explain.

The new missile carries a 450 kilogram warhead and is capable of "semi-autonomous" targeting, giving it some ability to steer itself, according to the budget request. Details of the stealthy cruise missile's range are classified. But US and other Western military officials estimate it can strike targets at distances greater than 800 kilometers.


The budget documents show the Pentagon is seeking $224 million to order another 53 of these missiles in 2021. The US Navy and Air Force expect to have more than 400 of them in service by 2025, according to orders projected in the documents.
An Air Force B1-B Lancer bomber launches a Long Range Anti-Ship Missile during flight testing in August 2013. U.S. Navy

This new anti-ship missile is derived from an existing Lockheed long-range, land attack weapon, the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile. The Pentagon is asking for $577 million next year to order another 400 of these land-attack missiles.

"The US and allied focus on long-range land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles was the quickest way to rebuild long-range conventional firepower in the Western Pacific region," said Robert Haddick, a former US Marine Corps officer and now a visiting senior fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies based in Arlington, Virginia.

For the US Navy in Asia, Super Hornet jets operating from aircraft carriers and armed with the new anti-ship missile would deliver a major boost in firepower while allowing the expensive warships to operate further away from potential threats, US and other Western military officials say.


Current and retired US Navy officers have been urging the Pentagon to equip American warships with longer-range anti-ship missiles that would allow them to compete with the latest, heavily armed Chinese cruisers, destroyers and frigates. Lockheed has said it successfully test-fired one of the new Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles from the type of launcher used on US and allied warships.

Haddick, one of the first to draw attention to China's firepower advantage in his 2014 book, "Fire on the Water," said the threat from Chinese missiles had galvanized the Pentagon with new strategic thinking and budgets now directed at preparing for high-technology conflict with powerful nations like China.

Haddick said the new missiles were critical to the defensive plans of America and its allies in the Western Pacific. The gap won't close immediately, but firepower would gradually improve, Haddick said.

"This is especially true during the next half-decade and more, as successor hypersonic and other classified munition designs complete their long periods of development, testing, production, and deployment," he said.

PUTIN'S RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE AND THE UNLEARNED LESSON OF THE RUSSO JAPANESE WAR

The recent tensions around Ukraine have brought the world to the brink of a global confrontation. Europe has not faced such a massive threat since the end of the Cold War. It seems that Putin has decided to risk it all in a single bet and gain his point by threatening a global confrontation and full-scale intervention in Ukraine. While most Western observers are concerned about the fate of Ukraine, the other face of the conflict concerns the fate of Russia. How might the future of the Russian Federation develop because of a possible war with Ukraine?

Break the Backbone of Revanchism

In one of his interviews, Sergey Karaganov, a leading Russian political theorist, gave voice to an idea that, in my opinion, is the answer to the only possible future for Russia. His interviewer told him that the well-being of Austria and Germany improved considerably after they gave up their claims to global power, suggesting a comparison between Nazi Germany and Putin’s Russia. In response, Karaganov bluntly stated that, unlike those countries’ spine, Russia's backbone has never been broken: “We are a nation of conquerors … while they were conquered.” For Karaganov, the unbroken backbone actually means an opportunity for revanche, or the return of a nation’s lost territory. But a war loss may actually be the only way for Russia to return into the family of nations.

The comparison between Nazi Germany and Putin’s Russia, which has become common recently, may have something to it. Both cases are characterized not by a sane politics but by revanchism and ressentiment. In his thinking, Putin opposes Russia to NATO and seeks to return to the global distribution of spheres of influence as it existed in 1997, prior to NATO’s expansion to Eastern Europe. He sees NATO’s subsequent expansion to the east as a betrayal, and considers revenge for this treachery to be righting a historical wrong. The Kremlin’s ideological claims to Ukraine show the true face of the matter, which admits no compromise: there can be no stable Russia in the foreseeable future, or peace and security in Europe, so long as the Kremlin deems its claims unpaid. The demand to bar Ukraine from NATO, which would violate NATO’s charter, proves that Putin is seeking conflict and is looking for a reason to be first mover. For the Kremlin, it is the military scenario today that is the primary tool for achieving the desired result: Russia’s return to greatness and restoration of its sphere of influence.

All of this has echoes with the situation on the eve of World War II. Germany and Hitler sought revenge for Germany’s shameful defeat in World War I. Hitler did not want to agree calmly on new lands or boundaries of influence, as the Munich Treaty showed. He wanted war. Today, this horrible lesson needs to be revisited. When dealing with revanchism and ressentiment, it is impossible to reach a rational agreement on peace and stability.

All countries recruit young men and women to go to war. They die and their families hope against hope that they died for a higher purpose.

So many do not die for a higher cause but just for some egotistical narcissist, megalomaniac with greedy fantasies of the possibilities of gaining power, money and delusions of grandeur and glory.

What a 1904 War Can Teach Vladimir Putin

The Russo-Japanese War led not just to an immediate revolution, but to deeper and longer-lasting change years later.

A Russian column trying to make progress along a muddy road during the Russo-Japanese War (Art Media / Print Collector / Getty)

When, in an expansionist mood, Russia embarked on an ill-judged war of territorial conquest against its neighbor, it did so with a grandiose sense of its conquering power. Russia’s leader, who ruled nearly as an absolute monarch and held his counterpart next door in contempt, believed that his country’s interests were threatened, that Russia deserved more influence and respect. He had envisioned a scenario in which his enemy would yield quickly in the face of overwhelming odds and accede to Russian territorial demands.

Contrary to the expectations of the sovereign and his military planners, the initial campaign went badly for Russia. This was partly because of snarled supply lines and logistics, but the biggest factor in Russia’s early defeats was its profound misjudgment of its foe. No pushover, Russia’s opponent surprised the world with its determination and ability to resist Russian might, aided by timely support from European allies.

Although the circumstances may sound familiar to anyone who has followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the above narrative actually describes the beginning of the 1904–05 Russo-Japanese War. The conflict set in motion or accelerated changes that impacted two world wars, the Cold War, and the present day, and offers profound lessons for contemporary leaders in Moscow and beyond. Indeed, Vladimir Putin’s military quagmire in Ukraine today is fraught with domestic dangers that, when they bubbled up during Czar Nicholas II’s reign, led to not just an immediate revolution but even bigger and longer-lasting changes years later.

Putin would recognize the unenviable predicament facing Czar Nicholas II in 1904, if he could bear to consider it. The czar had overestimated his nation’s military might, and the initial domestic support for Russia’s war with Japan began to falter as battlefield realities slowly started to seep in. Thanks to recent advances in telecommunications technology, there was no hiding that Russia’s armies were underperforming. Then, as now, Britain provided weapons and intelligence to Russia’s enemy, while the Poles seized the opportunity to collaborate militarily with Japan, which they viewed as the latest victim of Russian aggression. But the czar, isolated in his splendid palace, doubled down, a reckless gamble perhaps best epitomized by sending his Baltic naval fleet on an epic journey around the world to confront the Japanese navy in the Pacific. It did not return home.

Nicholas was nevertheless confident that Russia would ultimately emerge victorious; a reshuffling of strategy and greater commitment from the people would, he believed, tip the scales in Russia’s favor. The conflict raged for another year, but in the Battle of Mukden, in February 1905, the Japanese army broke the back of the Russian army, and shortly thereafter, the Japanese navy destroyed most of the remaining Russian Baltic fleet in the lopsided Battle of Tsushima.

An illustration depicts the sinking of a Russian battleship during the Battle of Tsushima. (Credit: Edward Matania / De Agostini / Getty)

Russia’s overconfident intransigence meant it missed an early window of opportunity whereby diplomacy—backed by a huge army and a respectable navy—could perhaps have secured some territorial concessions. Instead, it embarked upon a bloody contest, accompanied by credible reports of looting, civilian atrocities, and sexual violence. Russian troops proved themselves to be as brutal as feared in the territories they occupied. Russian generals were dismayed by the desultory performance of their troops, many of which lacked discipline and were unmotivated, as evidenced by widespread instances of soldiers disobeying orders. Russian efforts were also hampered by subpar technology, disagreement among commanders, a lack of combined arms coordination, and an inability to replace manpower and equipment losses in battle. Russia eventually pivoted to fighting to save face.

The unpopular and unnecessary war with Japan caused great turmoil within Russia. The economy was in disarray, food shortages were commonplace, and Russia was embarrassed internationally. For his failed war, among other poor decisions, the czar had lost the confidence of his people, sparking protests over economic woes and awful labor conditions (which were exacerbated by the conflict) that peaked on Bloody Sunday, a January 1905 episode in which the Russian Imperial Guard fired on unarmed protesters outside Nicholas’s Winter Palace in St. Petersburg, killing perhaps hundreds of demonstrators; they arrested thousands more. Facing military defeats coupled with domestic pressures, Nicholas finally sued for peace later in 1905. President Theodore Roosevelt presided over the Treaty of Portsmouth, which brought an end to hostilities. But peace with Japan did not bring domestic harmony: The 1905 Russian Revolution, which saw widespread unrest across the Russian empire, sowed the seeds for the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution that overthrew the czar and led to the murder of the Romanov dynasty.

Although the parallels between the Russo-Japanese War and the current invasion of Ukraine are striking, there are also key differences, and fully appreciating these distinctions is necessary to avoid facile conclusions. In 1904, Japan was an empire on the rise and embarking on its own expansionist period, leading to its confrontation with Russia’s hegemonic ambitions in East Asia. The two powers had been engaged in years of negotiations over territory in what is now northeast China and, in a notable similarity to their opening gambit at Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the Japanese in 1904 actually attacked first with a surprise strike on Russia’s naval fleet at anchor in Port Arthur on Manchuria’s Liaodong Peninsula before formally declaring war. And, like at Pearl Harbor, Japan badly damaged the fleet, thereby seizing the military initiative. Unlike the present-day Ukrainians, the Japanese did have a formidable naval fleet to bolster their expansionist agenda, and a loss for Japan would not have been existential for the country.

It is useful to illuminate the present and to confront the future by consulting the past. In this case, an analysis of the consequences of the Russo-Japanese War ought to concern Putin. There are many battlefield parallels between Russian military performance in these two wars, largely based on faulty assessments of the quality of their enemy. Putin’s far larger problem, however, is that throughout Russian history, humiliating military defeats have presaged major social and political upheaval. The Russo-Japanese War is but one example of this phenomenon. Russian failures against Germany in World War I helped usher in the Bolshevik Revolution, and the disastrous Soviet war in Afghanistan gravely weakened the political coherence and credibility of the Soviet Union. To be sure, these wars did not cause all of the social unrest in Russia. In each case, internal dynamics unrelated to the wars were at play, but they interacted with the conflicts in crucial ways. In each case, the military failures exacerbated structural problems and had an accelerating effect on Russian political developments.

After the 1905 revolution, the czar cracked down on dissent while also making nominal concessions, most notably allowing some popular political representation by creating a duma, though this was not a serious power-sharing arrangement. Likewise, there are Potemkin trappings of democratic governance in modern Russia, but no serious checks on Putin’s power. One risk with a personalized autocracy, like the Romanov monarch, is that the state is seen as synonymous with its leader. In the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian military’s rotten performance suggested, by extension, something of how rotten the state had become under the czar. Given how much Putin has personalized his rule in Russia, he now risks the shambles of the war in Ukraine becoming a proxy for his own mismanagement of Russia.

A colorized photo of three Japanese soldiers sitting near the wreckage of a Russian warship in Port Arthur. (Credit: Burton Holmes / Archive Farms / Getty)

History suggests that what domestic dissent Putin may have been able to manage before the invasion of Ukraine will be harder to grapple with in the future. The czar twice enjoyed a brief period of patriotic war fervor before his people turned on him after military defeats. This may inform Putin’s recent crackdowns on dissent, but it misses the benefit of history’s long view. Throughout Russian and Soviet history, social movements for change have often been met with repression and mass arrests, which, in time, have the opposite effect of what autocrats have intended.

The cracks of domestic discontent are already visible in Russia, thanks to Putin’s frequently contradictory lies to his own people. When the Ukrainians sank the Russian naval flagship Moskva, Russian state media falsely claimed that there had been a fire onboard, that the crew of more than 400 sailors had been rescued, and that the ship went down in rough seas under tow. The reality was that 100 Russian sailors, perhaps more, went down with the ship thanks to two strikes from Ukrainian missiles. Many of these sailors were conscripts who Putin claimed would not be fighting in Ukraine in the first place. Their families have now bravely spoken out about their sons’ deaths, demanding information and accountability from a regime that, heretofore, they suffered quietly.

Putin has written often about his views of history. If he were to consider the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War, he would do well to remember the war theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s dictum that war does not take place outside the context of the society that wages it. Indeed, domestic unrest as much as any battlefield setbacks against Japan finally convinced Czar Nicholas II to abandon his military campaign. The present-day families of the estimated many thousands of dead Russian soldiers are unlikely to keep their peace about this senseless slaughter, and perhaps a great many other complaints besides.

Modern-day Ukraine isn’t Japan of the early 20th century, but the similarities between the dire circumstances of each for Russia can illuminate the social and political drivers that history suggests may happen now on an accelerated timeline. In fact, much as the Russo-Japanese War shaped the contours of the 20th-century world, so, too, may Putin’s calamitous invasion of Ukraine drive the forces that define the 21st.

The disaster of the Russo-Japanese War scrubbed the veneer off Imperial Russia, and it confirmed the decay across the empire. That war ended with an emerging country boldly announcing itself on the world’s stage, a loss of prestige and influence for Russia, and eventually the end of the ruler himself.

The defeat also served as an incubator for those seeking revolutionary political change. “The European bourgeoisie has its reasons to be frightened, and the proletariat has its reasons to rejoice,” exclaimed Vladimir Lenin after the fall of Port Arthur. Today, identifying any clear challengers to Putin’s power is difficult. Opposition leaders such as Boris Nemtsov have been murdered or, like Alexey Navalny, poisoned and jailed. Even if a focal point of resistance has not yet emerged, however, Putin’s disastrous war in Ukraine may be the spark for unknown actors in Russia—or in exile—to organize. He should recall that in Russia, after disastrous foreign wars, domestic discontent is never far behind.

Can Russia be considered a superpower?

While the military and political capacity of Russia remains undoubted, its economic influence lags behind.Natalya Nosova





Politicians and experts (of sorts) like to play with this loaded term, but many disagree, for instance, Vladimir Putin.


In 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin called the U.S. the world’s only superpower. “America is a great power, the only remaining superpower, I guess… and we admit that we’re ready to work with the United States,” said Putin during the St. Petersburg Economic Forum. So, we can safely say that Russia isn’t a superpower, right? Let’s look at other opinions.

Some leaders and political scientists, however, still sometimes refer to Russia as a superpower: for instance, in July 2018, Austria’s Chancellor Sebastian Kurz called the summit between Putin and Donald Trump a good sign of “cooperation between two superpowers.” So, who is right?
What is a ‘superpower’?



The United Nations Security Council is certainly among places where Russia's words really have much weight.Getty Images

This seems like a good question to start off the whole superpower talk. The definitions differ but most political scientists agree: to be a superpower a country must have lots of military, economic, financial, cultural and ideological influence, and not just among its closest neighbors, but across the world.

“Zbigniew Brzezinski believes there are four factors necessary for a state to be a superpower: military, economic, scientific-technical and cultural,” writes Oleg Matveychev, a political scientist at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. This makes sense: in order to influence the whole world (and that’s what superpowers do) a state should possess the most modern weapons and have a large economy, but at the same time, it should awe the world with its wonders of culture and science.
Limited opportunities



Does Russia meet these criteria? In some fields Moscow definitely has something “superpower-ish” – for instance, Russia can count on huge military capacity ($47 billion defense budget, full-scale nuclear arsenal and the world’s second most powerful armed forces, according to Business Insider).

Politically, Russia’s weight on the international arena is also impressive: as a permanent member of the UN Security Council it has the right to veto on every major resolution. In addition, the country plays an important role in European affairs and, thanks to its active position in the Syrian conflict, Russia also has much weight in the Middle East. Russia’s economic potential, however, is not as big as that of the U.S. With the world’s 11th largest GDP, it’s certainly an important country, but definitely not a superpower, economy-wise.

The above-mentioned realities limit Russia’s global role. “There’s only one parameter that proves Russia is a global power: defense resources. In other fields, we are not as powerful as we want to be, and this leaves many questions regarding what’s going to be our country’s role in the 21st century,” Alexander Dynkin, president of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, told Kommersant.
Washington is lonely at the top

This wasn’t always the case: in the second half of the 20th century the USSR challenged the U.S. across the globe, a powerful menace that rivaled America in every field, be it military matters, politics, economic influence and culture.



Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev.Getty Images

“After two devastating world wars, the global community found itself in a stable and very abnormal, in terms of history, shape. Two states dominated the world, incomparable to any others in its power,” said Fedor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of the magazine, Russia in Global Affairs, in an interview. This bipolar world order defined the Cold War period.

“That’s when the term ‘superpower’ was coined, to distinguish those gigantic powers from the so-called ‘great powers” of the 19th century,’ Lukyanov added. Those included the UK, France, Germany, Russia and so on. But in the second half of the 20th century, there were only two superpowers. After the Cold war ended, one of the superpowers – the USSR – ceased to exist, and though Russia inherited some of its assets (nuclear status and a position on the UN Security Council), “its influence remained large but it was no longer unique,” the expert said.

Vladimir Putin seems to be right: while Russia is one of the major players in the international arena, it is not a superpower like the U.S. Can the latter remain the most powerful country on Earth, or will it eventually lose its crown, like what happened with the USSR? Only time can tell, but one thing is for sure - no one stays at the top forever.