In 524 BC, a Persian army of 50,000 disappeared sent by King Cambyses II in Egypt

 

 

 

Was the missing Persian army killed in an AMBUSH? Hieroglyphs may finally solve the 5th century disappearance of 50,000 men Dutch professor believes he's solved the mystery of missing Persian army Professor Kaper claims the 50,000-strong army was defeated in battle Previously it had been thought the army was swallowed by a sandstorm But new analysis of hieroglyphics reveals this story was merely a cover-up Instead they were defeated by a rebel army led by Petubastis III in 524 BC +3 Professor Kaper says that disappearance of a Persian army in 524 BC has been solved, thanks to deciphering ancient temple blocks (pictured) In 524 BC, a Persian army of 50,000 men sent by King Cambyses II marched into the Egyptian desert from Thebes - now known as Luxor. But, after entering the desert, they were never heard from again. For centuries. it has been presumed they were swallowed by a sandstorm, but now a researcher claims that wasn’t the case - and instead they must have been defeated in battle. In the 5th century BC, Greek historian Herodotus wrote that the disappearance of the army could be attributed to an unfortunate end involving sand dunes. University of Leiden Egyptologist Professor Olaf Kaper, however, disagrees. ‘Since the 19th century, people have been looking for this army: amateurs, as well as professional archaeologists,’ he said. ‘Some expect to find, somewhere under the ground, an entire army, fully equipped. ‘However, experience has long shown that you can't die from a sandstorm, let alone have an entire army disappear.’ Professor Kaper is now putting forward an entirely different explanation. He argues that the army did not disappear, but was instead, defeated. ‘My research shows that the army was not simply passing through the desert; its final destination was the Dachla Oasis,’ he said. ‘This was the location of the troops of the Egyptian rebel leader Petubastis III. ‘He ultimately ambushed the army of Cambyses, and in this way managed from his base in the oasis to reconquer a large part of Egypt, after which he had himself crowned Pharaoh in the capital, Memphis.’ +3 According to Herodotus, Cambyses II - the son of Cyrus the Great - sent the soldiers from Thebes to attack the Oasis of Siwa in 524 BC. Their mission was to destroy the oracle at the Temple of Amun after the priests there refused to legitimise his claim to Egypt. But after they left, they were never seen or heard from again +3 Herodotus wrote that the disappearance of the 50,000-strong Persian army (illustrated here) could be attributed to a sandstorm. Professor Kaper, however, claims Egyptian rebel leader Petubastis III ambushed them - but this embarrassment was swept under the rug by King Cambyses II Kaper said he made the discovery accidentally. In collaboration with New York University and the University of Lecce, he was involved for the last ten years in excavations in Amheida, in the Dachla Oasis. And earlier this year, he deciphered the full list of titles of Petubastis III on ancient temple blocks. ‘That’s when the puzzle pieces fell into place’, said the Egyptologist. ‘The temple blocks indicate that this must have been a stronghold at the start of the Persian period. ‘Once we combined this with the limited information we had about Petubastis III, the excavation site and the story of Herodotus, we were able to reconstruct what happened.’ THE MISSING PERSIAN ARMY OF 50,000 MEN According to the Greek historian Herodotus (484-425 BC), Cambyses, the son of Cyrus the Great, sent the soldiers from Thebes to attack the Oasis of Siwa in 524 BC. Their mission was to destroy the oracle at the Temple of Amun after the priests there refused to legitimise his claim to Egypt. After walking for seven days in the desert, the army was said to have arrived at an 'oasis', which historians believe was El-Kharga, 120 miles (190 kilometres) west of the Nile in the Libyan Desert. After they left, a great sandstorm sprung up and they were never seen again. Herodotus wrote 'a wind arose from the south, strong and deadly, bringing with it vast columns of whirling sand, which entirely covered up the troops and caused them wholly to disappear'. However, the new research by Professor Kaper says it wasn’t a sandstorm at all that defeated them - but rather another army in an embarrassing defeat, which was later covered up. The fact that the fate of the army of Cambyses remained unclear for such a long time is probably due to the Persian King Darius I, who ended the Egyptian revolt with much bloodshed two years after Cambyses’ defeat. He attributed the shameful defeat of his predecessor to natural elements, and 75 years after the events, all Herodotus could do was take note of the sandstorm story. But now this new research sheds light on one of the greatest archaeological mysteries of all time.

Son of Cyrus the Great: king of Persia 522 B.C.Cambyses was the oldest son of Cyrus the Great, the first king of the Achaemenid Empire (559-530). The name of Cambyses' mother is Cassandane. Cyrus appointed his son Cambyses as king of Babylon. Cambyses' reign in Babylon lasted for only one year after that Cambyses became satrap of Bactria.Cyrus fell in a battle against the Massagetes in the last weeks of 530. Before he left, he had appointed Cambyses as his successor. After ascending the throne, Cambyses married Phaedymia, the daughter of Otanes. The most important event during Cambyses' reign was the conquest of Egypt:The war took place in 525 BC, when Amasis II had just been succeeded by his son Psamtik III. Cambyses had prepared for the march through the desert by an alliance with Arabian chieftains, who brought a large supply of water to the stations. King Amasis had hoped that Egypt would be able to withstand the threatened Persian attack by an alliance with the Greeks.But this hope failed, as the Cypriot towns and the tyrant Polycrates of Samos, who possessed a large fleet, now preferred to join the Persians, and the commander of the Greek troops, Phanes of Halicarnassus, went over to them. In the decisive battle at Pelusium the Egyptian army was defeated, and shortly afterwardsMemphis was taken. The captive king Psammetichus was executed, having attempted a rebellion. The Egyptian inscriptions show that Cambyses officially adopted the titles and the costume of the Pharaohs.According toHerodotus, Cambyses sent an army to capture the Oracle of Amun at the Siwa Oasis. The army of 50,000 men was halfway across the desert when a massive sandstorm buried them all.While Cambyses was on a campaign, his brother Bardiya claimed the throne. While he was marching towards Persia, he was severely injured and died in March, 522 BC.   The remains of a mighty Persian army said to have drowned in the sands of the western Egyptian desert 2,500 years ago might have been finally located, solving one of archaeology’s biggest outstanding mysteries, according to Italian researchers. Bronze weapons, a silver bracelet, an earring and hundreds of human bones found in the vast desolate wilderness of the Sahara desert have raised hopes of finally finding the lost army of Persian King Cambyses II. The 50,000 warriors were said to be buried by a cataclysmic sandstorm in 525 B.C. “We have found the first archaeological evidence of a story reported by the Greek historian Herodotus,” Dario Del Bufalo, a member of the expedition from the University of Lecce, told Discovery News. According to Herodotus (484-425 B.C.), Cambyses, the son of Cyrus the Great, sent 50,000 soldiers from Thebes to attack the Oasis of Siwa and destroy the oracle at the Temple of Amun after the priests there refused to legitimize his claim to Egypt. After walking for seven days in the desert, the army got to an “oasis,” which historians believe was El-Kharga. After they left, they were never seen again. “A wind arose from the south, strong and deadly, bringing with it vast columns of whirling sand, which entirely covered up the troops and caused them wholly to disappear,” wrote Herodotus. A century after Herodotus wrote his account, Alexander the Great made his own pilgrimage to the oracle of Amun, and in 332 B.C. he won the oracle’s confirmation that he was the divine son of Zeus, the Greek god equated with Amun. The tale of Cambyses’ lost army, however, faded into antiquity. As no trace of the hapless warriors was ever found, scholars began to dismiss the story as a fanciful tale. Now, two top Italian archaeologists claim to have found striking evidence that the Persian army was indeed swallowed in a sandstorm. Twin brothers Angelo and Alfredo Castiglioni are already famous for their discovery 20 years ago of the ancient Egyptian “city of gold” Berenike Panchrysos. Presented recently at the archaeological film festival of Rovereto, the discovery is the result of 13 years of research and five expeditions to the desert. “It all started in 1996, during an expedition aimed at investigating the presence of iron meteorites near Bahrin, one small oasis not far from Siwa,” Alfredo Castiglioni, director of the Eastern Desert Research Center (CeRDO) in Varese, told Discovery News. While working in the area, the researchers noticed a half-buried pot and some human remains. Then the brothers spotted something really intriguing — what could have been a natural shelter. It was a rock about 35 meters (114.8 feet) long, 1.8 meters (5.9 feet) in height and 3 meters (9.8 feet) deep. Such natural formations occur in the desert, but this large rock was the only one in a large area. “Its size and shape made it the perfect refuge in a sandstorm,” Castiglioni said. Right there, the metal detector of Egyptian geologist Aly Barakat of Cairo University located relics of ancient warfare: a bronze dagger and several arrow tips. “We are talking of small items, but they are extremely important as they are the first Achaemenid objects, thus dating to Cambyses’ time, which have emerged from the desert sands in a location quite close to Siwa,” Castiglioni said. About a quarter mile from the natural shelter, the Castiglioni team found a silver bracelet, an earring and few spheres which were likely part of a necklace. “An analysis of the earring, based on photographs, indicate that it certainly dates to the Achaemenid period. Both the earring and the spheres appear to be made of silver. Indeed a very similar earring, dating to the fifth century B.C., has been found in a dig in Turkey,” Andrea Cagnetti, a leading expert of ancient jewelry, told Discovery News. In the following years, the Castiglioni brothers studied ancient maps and came to the conclusion that Cambyses’ army did not take the widely believed caravan route via the Dakhla Oasis and Farafra Oasis. “Since the 19th century, many archaeologists and explorers have searched for the lost army along that route. They found nothing. We hypothesized a different itinerary, coming from south. Indeed we found that such a route already existed in the 18th Dynasty,” Castiglioni said. According to Castiglioni, from El Kargha the army took a westerly route to Gilf El Kebir, passing through the Wadi Abd el Melik, then headed north toward Siwa. “This route had the advantage of taking the enemy aback. Moreover, the army could march undisturbed. On the contrary, since the oasis on the other route were controlled by the Egyptians, the army would have had to fight at each oasis,” Castiglioni said. To test their hypothesis, the Castiglioni brothers did geological surveys along that alternative route. They found desiccated water sources and artificial wells made of hundreds of water pots buried in the sand. Such water sources could have made a march in the desert possible. “Termoluminescence has dated the pottery to 2,500 years ago, which is in line with Cambyses’ time,” Castiglioni said. In their last expedition in 2002, the Castiglioni brothers returned to the location of their initial discovery. Right there, some 100 km (62 miles) south of Siwa, ancient maps had erroneously located the temple of Amun. The soldiers believed they had reached their destination, but instead they found the khamsin — the hot, strong, unpredictable southeasterly wind that blows from the Sahara desert over Egypt. “Some soldiers found refuge under that natural shelter, other dispersed in various directions. Some might have reached the lake of Sitra, thus surviving,” Castiglioni said. At the end of their expedition, the team decided to investigate Bedouin stories about thousands of white bones that would have emerged decades ago during particular wind conditions in a nearby area. Indeed, they found a mass grave with hundreds of bleached bones and skulls. “We learned that the remains had been exposed by tomb robbers and that a beautiful sword which was found among the bones was sold to American tourists,” Castiglioni said. Among the bones, a number of Persian arrow heads and a horse bit, identical to one appearing in a depiction of an ancient Persian horse, emerged. “In the desolate wilderness of the desert, we have found the most precise location where the tragedy occurred,” Del Bufalo said. The team communicated their finding to the Geological Survey of Egypt and gave the recovered objects to the Egyptian authorities. “We never heard back. I’m sure that the lost army is buried somewhere around the area we surveyed, perhaps under five meters (16.4 feet) of sand.” Mosalam Shaltout, professor of solar physics at the National Research Institute of Astronomy and Geophysics, Helwan, Cairo, believes it is very likely that the army took an alternative western route to reach Siwa. “I think it depended on their bad planning for sufficient water and meals during the long desert route and most of all by the occurrence of an eruptive Kamassen sandy winds for more than one day,” Shaltout told Discovery News. Piero Pruneti, editor of Archeologia Viva, Italy’s most important archaeology magazine, is also impressed by the team’s work. “Judging from their documentary, the Castiglioni’s have made a very promising finding,” Prunetic told Discovery News. “Indeed, their expeditions are all based on a careful study of the landscape… An in-depth exploration of the area is certainly needed!” MISSING IN ACTION http://news.discovery.com/archaeology/the-quest-for-cambyses-lost-army.html BY Rossella Lorenzi / Nov 09, 2009 Indeed, many archaeologists and adventures have been scouring the desert, dreaming of solving the 2,500- year-old mystery. Already in the 1800s, archaeology pioneer Giovanni Battista Belzoni explored the desert in vain, searching for the lost army. Perhaps the most famous desert explorer is the Austro-Hungarian Count László Almásy (1895-1951), whose life provided inspiration for Anthony Minghella’s film The English Patient. In 1936, Almásy ventured into the desert in search for clues of the vanished soldiers, but the Great Sand Sea’s giant dunes and the khamsin — the hot, strong, unpredictable southeasterly wind that blows from the Sahara desert over Egypt — stopped him. He re-emerged from the Saharan sands four days later — miraculously alive. In the last decade there have been several contrasting reports about intriguing findings in the Western Egyptian desert. It all started with reports about the 1996 Castiglioni brother expedition, and continued with geologist Aly Barakat’s announcement of important discoveries in the area around Bahrain. The revived interest over the lost army continued in 2000: reports circulated that a Helwan University geological team, prospecting for petroleum in the Western Desert, had stumbled across scattered human bones and ancient warfare relics such as daggers and arrowheads. Announcements of future serious investigation by the Egyptian Supreme Council of Antiquities (SCA) followed, but any information about that research has yet to be published. In 2003, geologist Tom Bown, accompanied by archaeologist Gail MacKinnon and a film crew, returned to the desert. Their search proved inconclusive. In 2005, another follow-up expedition by a team from the University of Toledo, Ohio, reached the area around Bahrain, but failed to find any significant remains, apart from a large number of fossilized sand dollars, which they believed could have been mistaken for human bone fragments. Now twin brothers Angelo and Alfredo Castiglioni (famous for their discovery 20 years ago of the ancient Egyptian “city of gold” Berenike Panchrysos) have finally shown their findings. Presented recently at the archaeological film festival of Rovereto, the documentary is the result of 13 years of research and five expeditions to the desert. Have they really located the remains of the mighty Persian army? “We can’t tell yet. But they have shown us the first ever Achaemenid objects, thus dating to Cambyses’ time, as they emerged from the sands near Siwa. This is amazing and certainly demands further research,” Piero Pruneti, editor of Archeologia Viva. HERODOTUS http://classics.mit.edu/Herodotus/history.3.iii.html http://www.google.com/cse?cx=000823599697007823270%3Axvyeoc7qlza&ie=UTF-8&q=Cambyses+&sa=Search http://www.livius.org/he-hg/herodotus/hist06.htm http://www.thefoghornmagazine.com/fact-block-2.php http://www.reshafim.org.il/ad/egypt/herodotus/cambyses.htm [3.26.1] “So fared the expedition against Ethiopia. As for those who were sent to march against the Ammonians, they set out and journeyed from Thebes with guides; and it is known that they came to the city of Oasis, inhabited by Samians said to be of the Aeschrionian tribe, seven days’ march from Thebes across sandy desert; this place is called, in the Greek language, Islands of the Blest. [3.26.2] Thus far, it is said, the army came; after that, except for the Ammonians themselves and those who heard from them, no man can say anything of them; for they neither reached the Ammonians nor returned back. [3.26.3] But this is what the Ammonians themselves say: when the Persians were crossing the sand from Oasis (probably the oasis of Kargeh) to attack them, and were about midway between their country and Oasis, while they were breakfasting a great and violent south wind arose, which buried them in the masses of sand which it bore; and so they disappeared from sight. Such is the Ammonian tale about this army.”

FROM SAILS TO DRONE TO FLOATING CITY SHIPS

 

 

 

 

Last surviving ship of America's 19th century whaling fleet returns to New Bedford as part of three-month voyage along New England coast The Charles W. Morgan arrived in New Bedford, Massachusetts, yesterday as part of historic three month tour The journey, dubbed The 38th Voyage, started on May 17 following a $10.6million five-year restoration project The 113-foot vessel was welcomed home as it arrived in New Bedford, where it was originally launched from in 1841 The last wooden whaleship in the world made a triumphant homecoming as it arrived in the port where it was originally launched 173 years ago, as part of its first voyage for more than a century. The Charles W. Morgan, the last surviving ship of America's 19th century whaling fleet, arrived at New Bedford, in Massachusetts, yesterday as part of its historic three month tour of New England ports. The journey, dubbed The 38th Voyage, started on May 17 following a five-year restoration at Mystic Seaport, costing $10.6million. +5 Homecoming: The last wooden whaleship in the world made a triumphant return home when it arrived in New Bedford, Massachusetts, yesterday +5 Historic: The Charles W. Morgan, the last surviving ship of America's 19th century whaling fleet is taking part in a historic three month tour of New England ports The 113-foot vessel was welcomed home yesterday as it arrived in New Bedford, where it first set sail from in July 1841. The 173-year-old ship is now due to remain docked at the New Bedford State Pier until July 6. It will officially open to the public on Saturday. The ship plans further stops at Provincetown, Massachusetts, and Boston, this summer before heading back to Mystic at the end of its voyage. The ship still has 18 per cent of its original wood, including the keel first laid in New Bedford, although it has also been fitted with some more modern appliances, including pumps, generators and lighting. +5 Attraction: The 173-year-old ship is now due to remain docked at the New Bedford State Pier until July 6 +5 Home again: The 113-foot vessel was welcomed home yesterday as it arrived in New Bedford, where it was originally launched in July 1841 +5 Tour: The ship plans further stops at Provincetown, Massachusetts, and Boston, this summer before heading back to Mystic at the end of its voyage The ship, which is not equipped with a motor, is being accompanied by a tug to aid it when it is not under sail. According to SouthCoastToday.com, upon the ship's arrival to New Bedford, Mystic Seaport President Steve White told the crew: 'The significance of the day is not lost on any of us. You were extraordinary.' The Morgan is America's second oldest ship which remains afloat - only the U.S.S. Constitution is older. According to Destination New Bedford, the ship embarked on a total of 37 voyages over an 80-year whaling career between 1841 and 1921.   The crewless drone boats that could replace cargo ships and be operated remotely from anywhere in the world Ships would have no crew on board Operated from a hi-tech virtual reality deck at the company's Norway HQ Cameras beam 360-degree views from the drone ship back to operators Rolls Royce has revealed dramatic plans to replace cargo ships with crewless 'drone boats' controlled remotely. The firm is developing a 'virtual deck' in Norway that would allow captains to remotely command ships anywhere in the world. Drone ships would be safer, cheaper and less polluting for the $375 billion shipping industry that carries 90 percent of world trade, Rolls-Royce says. +3 A fleet of drone ships: Drone ships would be safer, cheaper and less polluting for the $375 billion shipping industry that carries 90 percent of world trade, Rolls-Royce says. HOW THEY WOULD WORK Cameras would beam 360-degree views from the drone ship back to operators based in a virtual bridge. Rolls Royce is already testing a VR system in Norway for navigating the vessel remotely to steer them to their destinations. The firm eventually hopes it would be able to remove all crew from the ship. Rolls-Royce has already begun the process of designing giant drone ships able to shuttle cargo across the ocean minus a single solitary human being on board. The UK engineering group's Blue Ocean marine innovation department have announced the concept of the robot vessels they believe would be able to carry more cargo, cut costs, be safer and produce less pollution. Cameras would beam 360-degree views from the drone ship back to operators based in a virtual bridge VR system in Norway navigating the vessel remotely to steer them to their destinations. Talks have commenced over any regulatory obstacles and potential perceived hurdles and Rolls Royce are optimistic that the drone ships may be operational in ten years time. A Rolls-Royce Spokesperson says: 'Some steps have already been taken, mainly in the naval area, but we believe a first step will be moving certain functions on a ship ashore. 'For example, remote engine and equipment monitoring and some underwater operations - such as controlling ROVs - in the offshore sector could be the first.' +3 Cameras would beam 360-degree views from the drone ship back to operators based in a virtual bridge VR system in Norway navigating the vessel remotely to steer them to their destinations. The firm has already begun outfitting ships with advanced cameras. 'A growing number of vessels are already equipped with cameras that can see at night and through fog and snow - better than the human eye, and more ships are fitted with systems to transmit large volumes of data. 'So, some questions: given that the technology is in place, is now the time to move some operations ashore? Is it better to have a crew of 20 sailing in a gale in the North Sea, or say five people in a control room on shore? 'The same person could monitor and steer many ships.' The crewless ships would also be cheaper to build an maintain, Rolls Royce says. +3 Project Blueshark, where the US Navy is trialling virtual reality headsets. Here, a soldier is seen operating a virtual ship - with commands that could one day remotely control a real warship. now Rolls Royce has revealed similar plans for cargo ships. 'Many facilities and systems on board are only there to ensure that the crew is kept fed, safe, and comfortable. 'Eliminate or reduce the need for people, and vessels could be radically simplified, reducing construction costs. 'We think it is time to consider a roadmap to unmanned vessels of various types.'

The incredible mile-long floating CITY - complete with schools, a hospital, parks and an airport for its 50,000 residents The Freedom Ship is 25 storeys high and would feature a casino, an art gallery, a park and a shopping centre The concept, designed by a Florida-based company would cost $10billion if was commissioned to be built The vessel could house 50,000 people but it would contain additional space to hold an extra 30,000 visitors The ship would constantly sail around the world - doing a full circuit every two years - but would be too large to enter any ports Floating around the globe, drifting from country to country, never staying in one place long enough to get bored …  If you like travelling, life on the Freedom Ship, the world’s first floating city, sounds perfect. There’s only a couple of hitches – it’s not built yet, and it’s going to look an awful lot like a multi-storey carpark when it is. Scroll down for video +8 Designed by the Florida-based Freedom Ship International, the floating city, concept pictured, is set to cost $10 billion and weigh 2.7 million tonnes - making it too large to ever dock. The ship would spend the whole time at sea, circling the globe once every two years, powered by solar and wave energy THE FREEDOM SHIP IN NUMBERS Width: 750ft Length: 4,500ft Height: 350ft Weight: 2.7 million tones Capacity: 50,000 permanent residents with room for an extra 30,000 daily visitors, 20,000 crew and 10,000 overnight guests. Cost: $10 billion Buildings: Accommodation, schools, hospitals, businesses, parks, promenades, an art gallery, a shopping centre, casino and airport Its designers have released computer-generated photographs of what they hope the mile-long vessel will look like. It would have enough room for 50,000 permanent residents within its 25 storeys and boasts schools, hospitals, art galleries, shops, parks, an aquarium and a casino. It would even have its own airport on the roof, with a runway serving small private and commercial aircraft carrying up to  40 passengers each. Roger M Gooch, director and vice-president of Florida-based firm Freedom Ship International, said: ‘The Freedom Ship will be the largest vessel ever built, and the first ever floating city.’ His company is trying to raise the estimated £6billion needed to turn the dream, which has been several years in the planning, into an ocean-going reality.  ‘This will be a very heavily capitalised project and the global economy in the last few years hasn’t been too inviting for unproven progressive projects like ours,’ he added. ‘[But] in the last six months we’ve been getting more interest in the project and we are hopeful we will raise the $1billion (£600million) to begin construction.’ The ship would spend 70 per cent of its time anchored off major cities and the rest sailing between countries. Powered by solar panels and wave energy, the city would navigate from the east coast of the US across the Atlantic to Europe and into the Mediterranean. It would loop back and sail around the Cape of Good Hope at the tip of Africa and across to Australia. Heading into East Asia, it would steer across the Pacific before spending the end of the year on the west coast of North America. It would chase the summer sun into South America.  If completed, the city will be 750ft at the beam, 350ft high and 4,500ft in length – four times longer than the Queen Mary II cruise ship which measures 1,132ft. +8 Visitors and residents would be able to leave the ship, either by plane or by boat thanks to a dock at the rear, concept pictured, to visit cities and countries where the ship will also pick up supplies as and when needed +8 The Freedom Ship, concept pictured, is a mile long, 25 storeys high and features schools, hospitals, businesses, parks, promenades, an art gallery, a shopping centre, casino and airport on the roof +8 The planned route, pictured, would take the ship from the east coast of the U.S across the Atlantic into Europe, passing Italy before looping back and sailing around Africa and across to Australia. It would then travel into Asia before spending the end of the year on the west coast of the U.S and South America     +8 In addition to 50,000 permanent residents, the Freedom Ship would also have room for an extra 30,000 daily visitors, 20,000 crew and 10,000 overnight guests +8 The airport, on the ship's top deck, pictured, would serve private and small commercial aircraft carrying up to 40 passengers each. It could also be used to fly supplies to the ship. Aircraft could land and takeoff even when the ship is moving +8 This drawing shows a cross section of the ship. If built, the whole vessel would be 750ft wide, 350ft tall and 4,500 ft long. This would make it four times longer than the Queen Mary II cruise ship +8 The vessel, concept pictured, is just an idea at the moment until the Florida-based designers can raise at least $1 billion to start construction. The company said following a hiatus, and a drop in the global economy, it has started receiving interest in the ship again and hopes to raise this funding soon

Beijing 'setting precedent' in South China Sea

 

 

 

 

Chinese Air Force crew members inspect a J-20 stealth fighter in Chengdu, in southwest China's Sichuan province.

Chinese military troops stand at attention for visiting U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta at the Bayi Building in Beijing, on September 18, 2012. Panetta was on the second official stop of a three-nation tour to Japan, China and New Zealand.

China's Dangerous South China Sea Strategy China has shifted from salami slicing to ramming in the South China Sea.   Having created a new ‘fact’ by shifting an oil rig into Vietnam’s proclaimed EEZ off the disputed Paracel Islands, China is ramming home the reality it’s making. First, last month, it rammed and sank a Vietnamese fishing boat. Now, recent TV footage broadcast by Vietnam shows another incident on 1 June with a Chinese ship ramming a Vietnamese coast guard ship. Reporting the vision, The Wall Street Journal commented: The latest apparent collision … suggests China won’t moderate its activities in contested areas of the South China Sea, despite a broadside of criticism from senior Australian, Japanese and US officials at the Shangri-La gathering of military leaders and defence ministers. It’s time to accept that what China is doing is a full and official expression of Chinese policy. We’re long past the point where the Chinese system should be given some sort of leave pass because of suggestions that China isn’t a unified actor—a perspective that argues China’s ‘crisis management’ machinery consists of the PLA creating the crisis and the Chinese Foreign Ministry handling the outcry. As a description, that view has its attractions, but as an explanation it absolves the China polity of responsibility for its rash, ramming policy. We should take China at its word, in proclaiming itself a big and important power; and such powers are responsible for what their military and their coast guards and their energy agencies do in the name of the state. If the South China Sea is Asia’s cauldron as well as Asia’s Mediterranean, as Robert D. Kaplan writes, then the heat in the cauldron is up again. Kaplan’s Cauldron book has been out for a few months, offering an excellent set up for what has happened in the last few weeks as Vietnam is rammed. In surveying the ASEAN players, Kaplan judged, ‘It’s all up to Vietnam’. He has a quote from “a top US official” on ASEAN’s positioning: “Malaysia is lying low, Brunei has solved its problem with China, Indonesia has no well-defined foreign policy on the subject, the Philippines has few cards to play despite that country’s ingenious boisterousness and incendiary statements, Singapore is capable but lacks size.” Good luck, Vietnam. On such matters turn to the master, Professor Carl Thayer, particularly his analysis of Vietnam’s strategy. ASEAN can’t abandon Vietnam to its fate the same way it stepped back from the Philippines last year. Accepting that ramming is official Chinese policy, endorsed from the top, what could ASEAN do? Southeast Asia needs to shift its response to China away from a futile policy of trying to negotiate an agreement with Beijing. Whether by slicing or ramming, China is out to create more ‘facts’ proclaiming its sovereignty. No Chinese appetite exists for any multilateral deal. Beijing thinks it erred in agreeing to the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and it’s not going to compound that mistake by agreeing to a Code of Conduct (COC). Step forward Carl Thayer with some thoughts on how ASEAN can change the game. In a paper to the recent Asia-Pacific Roundtable in Kuala Lumpur, the professor noted that the COC effort is a waste of ASEAN’s energy because China will make it unachievable: The COC process has led to divisions within ASEAN and divisions among ASEAN’s claimant states. China’s assertion of ‘indisputable sovereignty’ over the South China Sea and its recent unprecedented aggressive assertion of sovereignty utilising military vessels with unsheathed weapons and military aircraft, is now the major impediment to managing the maritime commons in the South China Sea. The Thayer solution is for ASEAN to turn away from the pointless effort with China and negotiate an agreement within ASEAN—a Code of Conduct for Southeast Asia’s Maritime Commons. The ten countries of Southeast Asia would resolve territorial and maritime disputes with each other, using as a model the recent agreement between Indonesia and the Philippines demarcating maritime boundaries in the Celebes and Mindanao seas. As Thayer notes, the new code would stand beside ASEAN’s Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (1971), the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (1976) and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (1995): The proposed COC for Southeast Asia’s Maritime Commons would enhance ASEAN’s unity and cohesion, promote regional autonomy and ASEAN’s centrality in the region’s security architecture. Just launching the process would change the tone of the argument, not least by putting ASEAN back together again. China will almost certainly keep ramming, but it would be running into an ASEAN response based on unity, negotiation and legal agreement. That would be a significant response to Chinese force. Beijing 'setting precedent' in South China Sea China has sent four more oil rigs into the South China Sea amid mounting regional tensions. Analyst Ian Storey tells DW Beijing is likely to deploy more rigs in the future as it intends to assert its "historic rights." China has sent four more oil rigs into the South China Sea in a bid to step up exploration for oil and gas in the in the potentially energy-rich waters. According to media reports, coordinates released by China's Maritime Safety Administration showed the Nanhai number 2 and 5 rigs had been deployed roughly between China's southern Guangdong province and the Pratas Islands, which are occupied by Taiwan. The Nanhai 4 rig was towed to waters close to the Chinese coast. Coordinates for the Nanhai 9, indicated the fourth rig was set to be positioned in the Gulf of Tonkin, an area disputed between China and Vietnam. Beijing's move comes less than two months after it deployed the giant Haiyang Shiyou 981 drilling platform in Vietnam's claimed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which led to violent anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam as well as accusations from both sides. Beijing claims almost the entire South China Sea, rejecting rival claims from Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. In a DW interview, Ian Storey, an analyst at the Singapore-based Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), tells DW the deployment of the rigs highlights Beijing's determination to assert jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea and that the international community only has very limited options to stop it. DW: Is China setting a precedent by sending more oil rigs? Ian Storey: Yes, it is and we can expect to see Beijing deploy more in the future. What message is China sending to neighboring countries? Vietnam and China have traded accusations, with each side claiming the other has engaged in aggressive behavior against its ships China is telling its neighbors that it intends to assert its so-called "historic rights" to maritime resources such as oil, gas and fish within the nine-dash line, a line that the majority of international legal experts regard as being incompatible with the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). How does the latest move fit in China's overall territorial strategy in the South China Sea? "Territory" means land - or in this case the disputed atolls - and what we are really talking about here is an attempt by China to assert jurisdictional rights in the maritime domain. What options do Southeast Asian nations have to counter China's moves? The Southeast Asian claimants in the South China Sea have very limited options. They certainly don't want to get into a shooting match with Beijing as the Chinese military, which has undergone a rapid program of modernization over the past two decades, would quickly prevail. Diplomatically they can demand, as Vietnam has, that China withdraws its rigs - but Beijing will simply ignore this request. DW RECOMMENDS China's RIMPAC debut 'unlikely to ease tensions' Seeking closer military ties, China will participate for the first time in the world's largest naval exercise. But the move is unlikely to restore trust between Beijing and its neighbors, analyst James Holmes tells DW. (23.06.2014) China accuses Vietnam of ramming its ships more than 1,400 times in disputed waters Japan-ASEAN ties 'may stabilize balance of power' China's maritime disputes: 'Fear, honor and interest' I think the best option for Hanoi is to mount a legal challenge to the deployment of the oil Haiyang Shiyou 981 rig at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in The Hague. However, even if ITLOS were to rule in Vietnam's favor, I think China would simply ignore it and absorb the costs to its reputation. What can the international community, and especially the United States, do to deescalate tensions? The options are limited. The US isn't going to risk a conflict with China over the presence of oil rigs in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, the international community should continue to raise its concerns with China that unilateral and provocative actions such as this risk undermining regional peace and stability. The international community should also continue to emphasize the importance of freedom of navigation, and that China should bring its claims into line with UNCLOS. At the end of the day though, this crisis will only be resolved when China withdraws the oil rig which it says it will do on August 15. A new crisis will emerge when the rig is deployed again into disputed waters, most likely into the Philippines' EEZ. That will really test the limits of the US-Philippine alliance.   China’s Information Warfare Campaign and the South China Sea: Bring It On! As its dispute with Vietnam continues, China is trying to have it both ways at the United Nations. The maritime confrontation between China and Vietnam over the placement of oil rig HYSY 981 in disputed waters in the South China Sea that began in early May is now entering its seventh week. On June 9 China unexpectedly opened a new front when Wang Min, Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations, presented Secretary General Ban Ki-moon a formal position paper on the dispute with a request that he circulate it to all 193 UN members. China’s action in internationalizing its dispute with Vietnam does not represent a change in its long-standing policy that maritime disputes can only be settled bilaterally through direct consultations and negotiation of the parties directly concerned. A day after China submitted its position paper, Hua Chunying, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that China rejected United Nations arbitration of its dispute with Vietnam. Why then did China take its dispute with Vietnam to the United Nations? In 2003 the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and Central Military Commission formally adopted the doctrine of “three warfares” (san zhong zhanfa). The three warfares doctrine is an essential element of information warfare. According to “China’s Three Warfares,” a 2012 study written by Timothy A. Walton for Delex Consulting, Studies and Analysis, China’s “three warfares” comprises three components: psychological warfare, media warfare, and legal warfare. It is the latter two components that shaped China’s position paper. Media warfare, according to Walton, is a strategy designed to influence international public opinion to build support for China and to dissuade an adversary from pursuing actions contrary to China’s interests. China’s position paper was sent to the United Nations in order to outflank Vietnam’s own propaganda effort and to isolate Vietnam. The vast majority of UN members have no direct interest in territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Many Southeast Asian states that hold concerns about China’s actions would shirk at being forced to take a public stand on the issue. Legal warfare, according to Walton, is a strategy to use China’s domestic and international law to claim the legal high ground to assert Chinese interests. China’s position paper is replete with selected references to international law to support China’s stance. Initially, China defended its placement of the oil rig by arguing that it was within China’s territorial waters. China noted that the HYSY 981 was located 17 nautical miles from Triton islet, the western most feature of the Paracel Islands. Under the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), territorial waters only extend 12 nautical miles from a state’s coastal baselines. China’s June 6 statement amended this error by claiming that the HYSY 981 was within China’s contiguous zone. This new claim, however, lacks legal foundation. According to UNCLOS the sole purpose of the contiguous zone is to enable a coastal state to  “exercise the control necessary to: (a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea; (b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea.” China has also attempted to obfuscate its dispute with Vietnam by advancing the argument that the location of HYSY 981 is closer to the Paracel Islands than to the Vietnamese coastline. China’s position paper argues, for example, that HYSY 981 was operating 17 nautical miles from both Triton islet and the baselines drawn around the Paracels and 133 to 156 nautical miles from Vietnam’s coastline. At the same time, China claims sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal, which is located closer to the Philippines than to the nearest Chinese land feature. Under international law, mere proximity is not sufficient to demonstrate sovereignty. China’s position paper to the UN actually undermines its use of legal warfare to advance its case. For example, China’s position paper states: The waters between China’s Xisha (Paracel) Islands and the coast of Vietnamese mainland are yet to be delimited. The two sides have not yet conducted delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf in these waters. Both sides are entitled to claim EEZ and continental shelf in accordance with the UNCLOS If this is the case, China should have followed the provisions of UNCLOS to deal with overlapping claims. Both China and Vietnam should have entered into provisional arrangements over the disputed area until agreement was reached on delimitation. During this period each side was enjoined from altering the status quo and from the threat or use of force. Clearly China’s placement of the oil rig in disputed waters violated international legal principles. But China’s position paper undermines its legal case by arguing that international law is irrelevant. The position paper states: However, these waters will never become Vietnam’s EEZ and continental shelf no matter which principle (on international law) is applied in the delimitation. China’s Ambassador to Australia, Ma Zhaozu, contributed to Beijing’s information warfare campaign by repeating the same argument in an op-ed article in The Australian on June 13. Ma argued that the disputed area has never been delimited and “no matter which principle [of international law] is applied these waters concerned will never become Vietnam’s part of EEZ and continental shelf.” China’s formal tabling of a position paper with the UN Secretary General should be taken up by members of the international community that are concerned about escalating tensions between China and Vietnam and their possible impact on regional security.  These states should argue that the matter be taken up by the Security Council. China should not be permitted to pursue information warfare in order to have it both ways – circulating a position paper to the UN in order to demonstrate the serious nature of its dispute with Vietnam and rejecting UN arbitration. The United States and Australia should press for a UN Security Council debate. Japan and other maritime powers with a stake in stability in the South China Sea should join in. China should be forced into the uncomfortable position of opposing any Security Council debate and thus scuttling its attempt to use UN for propaganda purposes, or to veto any resolution arising from a debate in the Security Council critical of China’s action in the South China Sea.     Does India Still Fear China's Growing Military Might? Almost a decade later, China's so-called "string of pearls" strategy has lost much of its shine. Why? At one point in the movie Beaches, Bette Midler's rather egotistical character C. C. Bloom inquires: "But enough about me, let's talk about you. What do you think of me?" In Beaches, it was all about C. C. Bloom. It's all about China in Asia these days. But enough about China and its dominance of the headlines. Let's talk about India. What does India think of China? One thing is clear: Indians do think about China, which has steadily expanded its strategic footprint in the Indian Ocean. And they worry about Asia's would-be Big Brother. Indian strategists see ulterior motives at work even in such nondescript endeavors such as the counterpiracy mission in the Gulf of Aden, where by most accounts, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) has been a valuable partner. Angst-ridden words have issued from New Delhi at times. Yet Indian leaders have modulated their rhetoric in recent years. They appear increasingly comfortable with the strategic outlook in South Asia. Anxieties have receded, though they haven't evanesced entirely and probably never will. And the leisurely pace (and fitful progress) of India's naval and military buildup belies any worried talk from officialdom. That's all good. All in all, New Delhi's more relaxed attitude toward Chinese naval expansion fits the strategic circumstances better than the anxieties of a decade ago. Then, Indians saw a Chinese naval juggernaut barging into their maritime environs, ringing the subcontinent with a network of hostile naval bases, and assuming command of Indian Ocean waters and skies—to the detriment of Indian primacy. Now, they seemingly understand that India commands enduring advantages in nearby seas and skies, never mind that it remains weaker than China by economic and military metrics; that Beijing has challenges aplenty to occupy its military resources in the China seas, and less to spare for South Asian adventures; and thus, that any truly menacing Chinese naval presence remains far off in the distance. Sobriety prevails. To track the evolution of India's posture, consider the Strange Case of China's String of Pearls. Ten years ago, the defense consultancy Booz Allen compiled a classified study for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Titled Energy Futures in Asia, the study garnered instant fame when it went public in 2005. Why? Because the study's framers hit upon a catchy phrase for Beijing's ambitions in the Indian Ocean. China, they opined, was pursuing a "string-of-pearls" strategy along the southern rimland. Its goal: to gain access to port facilities in countries such as Sri Lanka and Pakistan for merchantmen and PLA Navy warships. China courted diplomatic ties with South Asian governments, bankrolled seaport development at sites such as Gwadar in southwestern Pakistan, and proffered economic and infrastructure assistance of various types to sweeten bargains for access—and in turn for energy security. Such overtures appeared ominous to Indian strategists who worried that China would assemble a network of full-blown naval bases to project power into South Asia—much as Western sea powers did during the heyday of imperialism. Now, from a strictly Mahanian standpoint, this was cause for alarm. Naval sage Alfred Thayer Mahan made naval stations one of three pillars of sea power, something any seafaring state must obtain to carry on foreign commerce and command distant waters. Bases provide forward-deployed vessels and aircraft fuel, ammunition, and spare parts, execute repairs and upkeep, offer venues for crew rest and relaxation, you name it. It's hard to project—and sustain—power across thousands of miles without such outposts. The United States has ruled Asian seas and skies for seventy years, in large part because of bases such as Yokosuka and Sasebo in Japan. Indians fretted that a predatory China might replicate this feat in South Asia. China has grown far stronger since the Booz Allen report, yet India has mellowed. Why? Because some elemental facts about strategy, hardware, and tactics have sunk in—and prudence with them: - One, India is the home team in any Sino-Indian contest. India is closer to likely theaters of action, boasts more manpower and bases, and knows the physical and cultural terrain better than remote China does. It can deploy the logic of access denial to curb Chinese inroads in the Indian Ocean—much as China has employed this logic to inhibit America's freedom of action in East Asia. - Two, New Delhi isn't alone in the nautical competition. Strong seagoing states like Japan, Australia, and of course the United States have a stake in deterring Chinese aggression in India's backyard. Beijing's provocative actions in the East and South China seas supply an adhesive for a balancing coalition, portending what could come to be in South Asia. New Delhi can tap the potential for coalition-building, supplementing its strength with that of likeminded sea powers.

General view of the meeting between Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi (5th L) and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh (5th R) at the Government's Guesthouse, in Hanoi June 18, 2014. (Reuters) - China's top diplomat scolded Vietnamese officials during talks in Hanoi on Wednesday for "hyping up" a row over a Chinese oil rig drilling in disputed waters in the South China Sea, in tough comments that suggest relations will remain rocky. State Councilor Yang Jiechi also told his hosts that the rig's activities in waters also claimed by Vietnam were "completely legal", China's Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said at a daily briefing in Beijing. Yang, who outranks the country's foreign minister, made the remarks in a meeting with Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh. Before the visit, experts had said many obstacles remained to resolving one of the worst breakdowns in Sino-Vietnamese relations since the neighbours fought a brief war in 1979. Among them is Beijing's demand for compensation in the wake of anti-Chinese riots that erupted in Vietnam after the drilling platform was deployed on May 2.   China’s advance spurs Indonesian military shift Thursday, May 29, 2014 09:07 Indonesian navy commandos guard a beach in Nusa Dua, Bali, Indonesia during an economic summit. China’s intensifying move to assert claims over the South China Sea has given fresh impetus to a military buildup in Indonesia that will see its forces deployed with greater focus on external risks. After years of concentrating on separatist threats across an archipelago long enough to stretch from New York to Alaska, Indonesia plans to deploy attack helicopters to its islands at the southern end of the South China Sea and expand its naval power. The front-runner for July’s presidential election, Joko Widodo, aims to boost defense spending to 1.5 percent as a share of the economy, which is Southeast Asia’s largest. The strategy shift comes as China escalates disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam, fellow members of the Association of Southeast Asean Nations. China’s standoff with Vietnam over an oil rig this month followed its 2012 success in taking control of the Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines. “The focus in defense spending is moving to dealing with external threats,” said Tim Huxley, executive director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Singapore. “There is a concern from an Indonesian perspective that the South China Sea should not become a Chinese lake and that freedom of shipping should be maintained.” That is influencing Indonesia’s defense spending and procurement, he said. The military is about 40 percent of the way to developing a minimum-essential force, or MEF, by 2029, to guard its territory as it adds tanks, submarines, helicopters and jet fighters to its arsenal, Deputy Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin said in an interview in Jakarta. Under the MEF, the government is seeking to acquire 274 Navy ships, 10 fighter squadrons and 12 new diesel-electric submarines. “We’re part of maintaining regional stability and peace and to maintain that we must certainly have powers that support that regional strength,” Sjamsoeddin said. China’s map Indonesia has sought to stay out of its neighbors’ spats with China over the South China Sea, and is not an official claimant to areas in dispute. But in recent months it has said that China’s interpretation of its nine dash-line map -- the basis for its territorial claims -- is seeping into Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone. Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa said in an interview in April that he wanted an explanation of China’s map and asked the United Nations to help obtain clarity. Commodore Fahru Zaini, assistant deputy to the chief security minister for defense strategic doctrine, said in March that China’s map included an “arbitrary claim” to waters off the Natuna Islands in the Indonesian province of Riau. “This dispute will have a large impact on the security of Natuna waters,” he said, according to Antara News. 17,000 islands Indonesia has some 17,000 islands to police, stretched across 5,300 kilometers (3,293 miles) from east to west. The Malacca Strait that Indonesia shares with Malaysia is a key shipping lane that links the economies of countries such as India, China and Japan. “It’s the largest country in Southeast Asia and they want to play what they think is a corresponding role,” Richard Bitzinger, senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, said. “You’re not going to get that unless you develop a sizable, modern military, because at this point the military is pretty small potatoes.” Military spending increased to 81.96 trillion rupiah ($7.1 billion) in 2013 from 72.94 trillion rupiah in 2012, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. ‘Balanced force’ China’s defense budget will rise 12.2 percent this year to 808.2 billion yuan ($129 billion). President Xi Jinping has made a navy with longer reach a priority to boost China’s claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea. Despite being a maritime country, Indonesia seeks to build a “balanced force” between the army, the navy and the air force, Sjamsoeddin said in the March interview, as “eventually all battles end on land.” Indonesia, which is also spending on tanks, faced decades of internal discord in East Timor, an independent nation since 2002. Indonesia isn’t in an arms race and spends less than 1 percent of gross domestic product on defense, compared with 3 percent to 4 percent among other Asean nations, Sjamsoeddin said. If countries in the region have heavy tanks then Indonesia should have heavy tanks, said Sjamsoeddin, 61, adding some military equipment in use is older than he is. Natuna islands Indonesia will deploy four Boeing Apache attack helicopters to the Natuna Islands, IHS Jane’s reported on its website in March, citing General Budiman, the army’s chief of staff, as a pre-emptive measure against instability in the South China Sea. With China more assertive in the southern part of the South China Sea, “the Indonesian armed forces are strengthening their military presence on the Natuna Islands, and that includes preparing facilities on the Natuna Islands to accommodate jet fighters,” said Ian Storey, senior fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore. How far Indonesia pushes back against China may depend on the presidential election, with neither candidate detailing foreign policy goals so far. Widodo, who will face off against a former general, Prabowo Subianto, pledged to boost defense spending to 1.5 percent of GDP within five years, according to his policy paper. Spending is now 0.9 percent of GDP, according to Sipri. “There seems to be a commitment to increasing defense spending, increasing Indonesia’s overall military strength, more in accordance to what they see is a normal, large power in the region,” Bitzinger said. “They’re increasingly interested too in being able to be a modern military, to project power.”   CHINA UNDETERRED AND UNAPOLOGETIC China’s audacious land reclamation activities in the South China Sea are only the latest sign that its approach to settling maritime disputes with its neighbors has taken a sharp and dangerous turn. Although China began acting more assertively after perceiving its ascension to great power status in the wake of the global financial crisis, Beijing still felt compelled to justify its muscular movements in Asia as necessary reactions to the provocations of “troublemakers” in the region. Sure, China was standing strong, but arguably in response to the adventurism of others. It was more retaliatory than overtly belligerent. As Beijing made a habit of tempering and justifying its behavior, leading Western analysts developed terms like “reactive assertiveness” and described Chinese revisionism as “cautious and considered.” The seizureof Scarborough Reef in the South China Sea in April 2012 was explained as a compulsory response to the Philippines’ use of a naval vessel (rather than a coast guard ship) to interdict illegal Chinese fishermen. Similarly, China’s persistent incursions into Japanese-administered waters around the Senkaku Islands have been, according to Beijing, an obligatory answer to Tokyo’s purchase and “nationalization” of the islands in September 2012. Over the last eight months, however, China’s efforts to alter Asia’s geography have become unequivocally self-initiated. On the eve of Vice President Biden’s trip to Beijing last November, China announced the establishment of a new air defense identification zone in the East China Sea that extended over areas controlled by Japan and South Korea. This triggered widespread speculation about what had compelled Beijing to make this provocative move. Was it comments by the Japanese defense minister threatening to shoot down Chinese drones that wandered into Japanese airspace? It had to be something, right? The following month saw the promulgation of new fishing regulations with which China blessed itself with additional legal authorities in the South China Sea, further advancing its claims over hotly contested territories. Nowhere to be found, however, was the kind of defensive pretext that would have accompanied a similar step in years prior. Fast-forward to May 2014 and China sent a $1 billion oil rig into disputed waters off the coast of Vietnam. Desperate for an explanation, American commentators speculated that perhaps this was a retort to President Obama’s April trip to the region. But again, the Chinese offered no excuses, arguing instead that they were conducting normal economic activities in Chinese waters. And now comes land reclamation and the enlargement of small outcrops into islands that will likely be used for military activities. Not content to simply change facts on the ground, China is now changing the ground. In public, Chinese officials continue to deny this shift toward proactive assertiveness. Lieutenant General Wang Guanzhong told a capacity crowd at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on June 1 that, “China has never taken the first step to provoke troubles.” This rhetoric is likely to endure, but unfortunately for China’s propaganda machine, the track record of the last several months speaks for itself. So what’s changed? At least three elements explain this more assertive turn. First, the newly appointed President Xi Jinping is willing—and he hassaid as much—to be more forceful in achieving China’s territorial aims and to accept higher degrees of regional instability in the process. Second, China’s governing institutions have become more coherent through theconsolidation of maritime agencies and stronger coordination among its national security policymaking bodies. And finally, Chinese capability is growing in terms of both military and maritime capacity, as well as economic instruments like the deep water oil rig now floating off the coast of Vietnam. It’s actually not that complicated. China is changing the status quo in Asia because it wants to and thinks it can. Xi Jinping is a confident and powerful leader with a high-priority to-do list, and he’s increasingly enabled with greater capabilities and the institutions to deploy them. Mix in an economic slowdown and a healthy dose of nationalism and you have a recipe for revisionism. The result, however, is that American aspirations for China’s rise have gone terribly off-script. For decades, U.S. policy toward China has comprised a dual-track “hedging” strategy that includes engaging Beijing in an effort to induce China to support the existing international order, accompanied by a balancing component in which the United States and its allies deter Beijing from choosing an aggressive path. But now this strategy is coming apart at both ends: China neither accepts the territorial realities of Asia, nor is it deterred from coercive acts of revisionism. The real problem is that China’s bullying will endure as long as no one gets in the way. Why wouldn’t it? Beijing is pushing on an open door, incurring few tangible costs for its assertiveness and appearing to believe (perhaps rightly so) that it can ride out whatever regional criticism arises in response. Based on its track record of the last several years, it’s understandable that Beijing remains confident that most countries in the region will, at the end of the day, be unwilling to imperil their economic relationship with China. Alarm bells ought be ringing more loudly in Washington. Ultimately, it will be up to the United States to staunch China’s mounting revisionism. But this will first require a sober recognition that the old theories of how to shape China’s rise aren’t working. This is a difficult conversation to have in Washington because acknowledging Chinese behavior for what it is—undeterred and unapologetic assertiveness—will necessitate a more serious American response than we have seen to date. This doesn’t mean forgoing the cooperative elements of the “hedge” and committing to a highly competitive relationship with China. We’re not there yet. And besides, there’s a big difference between determining that China is presently undeterred versus determining that it is patently undeterrable. Before definitively drawing the latter conclusion, the immediate task for U.S. policymakers is to test the elasticity of Chinese decision-making. This calls for greater attention to cost-imposition strategies that attempt to shape the relative value of continued revisionism for China. Washington will have to explore the full potential range of economic, military, diplomatic and political points of leverage over Beijing (and there are many) to increase the costs of Chinese assertiveness, including areas that directly impinge on the interests of China’s leaders. The United States will also have to develop more tailored options for responding directly to maritime coercion in ways that repel specific acts of revisionism, rather than simply exacting lateral forms of punishment after the fact. China’s slow but steady revisions to the territorial status quo in Asia are not a legacy the Obama administration wants to leave behind. Being more proactive in stemming this behavior represents the principal challenge for Washington’s China policy today.     Image Credit: Flickr/ anthonylibrarian How Indonesia and the Philippines Solved Their Maritime Dispute The recent Indonesian-Philippine maritime pact offers important lessons for the South China Sea disputes. The recent conclusion of negotiations over maritime boundaries between Indonesia and the Philippines was a significant development for the two ASEAN member states. Their negotiation commenced in June 1994 and was dormant until 2003. The positive turn came amidst rising tensions in the South China Sea sparked by worsening disputes over competing maritime claims. The successful conclusion of the talks between Jakarta and Manila holds important lessons for all claimant states over disputed waters in the South China Sea. How it began In December 2003, I was assigned to jumpstart the maritime boundaries negotiation with the Philippines that was left dormant by both countries for almost a decade. I worked with my counterpart until 2010 when I left for Brussels, with my successor continuing the negotiation until it was completed and signed just last month on May 23, 2014 in Manila. Negotiations on maritime boundaries require patience and resolve. It is a long haul. Negotiation with the Philippines is particularly significant because Indonesia and the Philippines are two of the largest archipelagic countries in the world, initiators of the archipelagic legal principle, and member states of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Yet the Philippines was left with the historical issue of the rectangular line of the Treaty of Paris of 1898, which ended the Spanish-American War but left behind unclear territorial boundaries with Manila’s neighbors. Indonesia disputed the rectangular line of this Treaty on the ground that it did not conform with UNCLOS 1982, which Indonesia and the Philippines are parties to. It was a complicated issue for both countries because Indonesia rejected the claim. While my Philippine counterpart understood the reasons for our objection, they were under intense domestic pressure to somehow keep the Treaty of Paris on the table. The Philippines eventually aligned its position with UNCLOS 1982 and thus cleared the way for the conclusion of the maritime boundaries negotiation. The alignment of the Philippines position with UNCLOS 1982 can be seen as commendable state practice in international law. Negotiation over Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI) When maritime boundaries negotiations were going on between Indonesia and the Philippines as well as Indonesia and Malaysia, I was also involved in 2007 in the negotiation over the Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI) – a multilateral partnership of six countries – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands. Of these countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Timor-Leste had no maritime boundaries in 2007. Yet they managed to work together, even establishing a Secretariat, to address the urgent threats facing the coastal and marine resources of one of the most biologically diverse and ecologically rich regions on earth. On another front, in the busiest waters on earth – the Strait of Malacca and Singapore – the three littoral states of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have been able to work together in the areas with little maritime boundaries, all for the larger good. Two lessons for South China Sea claimants There are two important lessons arising from the negotiations between Indonesia and the Philippines over their bilateral maritime boundaries. Firstly, whether you like it or not, the current prevailing law to settle maritime boundaries is UNCLOS. This is true regardless of your historical record, even if it is 115 years old. If a rectangular line map from a century-old Treaty had to be aligned with UNCLOS, aligning a dash-line map that was created only in the mid-1940s with UNCLOS should be relatively problem-free. While there is a difference in shape between the rectangular line of the Treaty of Paris that the Philippines previously used with Indonesia, and the nine dash-line map that China currently bases its maritime claims in the South China Sea on, they share one similarity: both are unilateral expressions of claims that are not based on international law. The first Indonesia-Philippines maritime boundary signifies the emergence of a state practice whereby in a maritime boundary dispute a unilateral proclamation of maps will eventually be aligned with prevailing international law. Secondly, the claimants need not look far to see how countries in the region can work together for the larger interest over a large swath of waters devoid of maritime boundaries. The larger interest in CTI is the protection of the environment; in the Straits of Malacca, it is maritime security. They are public goods promoted and protected by countries regardless of the lack of maritime boundaries. These are concrete and excellent state practices in Southeast Asia. These are also clear examples demonstrating that we in Southeast Asia do have a culture of international law. Therefore, the recent escalations in the overlapping claims in the South China Sea are not the regional norm. They are an anomaly to the existing state practice in Southeast Asia and must be corrected. It is my conviction that all claimant states in the South China Sea, especially China, which is also a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, carry the moral, political, and legal responsibility of creating peace and stability in the world and are able to work together peacefully. Asia could very well be a world leader in conflict prevention and management of disputes regardless of the existence of boundaries. This can be done by putting the larger common interest and public goods, namely regional stability and security, over and above narrow national views. Are we up to the test?