FILIPINOS ABOARD LST IN THE Spratly Islands HANG TOUGH — On board the crumbling carcass of this World War II-era warship, Filipino marine 1st Lt. Mike Pelotera and his eight men make their way to a mid-level deck to raise the Philippine flag up a leaning pole and then salute it. Across the calm, turquoise waters, two Chinese coast guard ships lurk, looking on. Its hull riddled with holes and rust, the BRP Sierra Madre has become a fragile symbol of the Philippines' claim to Second Thomas Shoal, an eight-kilometer (five-mile) -long submerged coral outcrop that has been disputed by China and the Philippines for years. It's a lonely ship, where Pelotera and his team wage a daily battle against isolation. A dilapidated Philippine Navy ship LT 57 (Sierra Madre) with Philippine troops deployed on board is anchored off Second Thomas Shoal, locally known as Ayungin Shoal, Sunday, March 30, 2014 off South China Sea. On Saturday, China Coast Guard attempted to block the Philippine government vessel AM700 carrying fresh troops and supplies, but the latter successfully managed to docked beside the ship to replace troops who were deployed for five months. (AP Photo/Bullit Marquez) "There's a point where you tend to feel low," Pelotera said of the challenges of his team's four-month deployment at the reef, where there is no land to stand on and nothing to stare at all day but sea. "But we have to kill the boredom because there is an important mission to fulfill." The Philippine navy inherited the former U.S. tank-landing ship USS Harnett County in 1976, and ran it deliberately aground at Second Thomas Shoal in 1999. A Chinese frigate and maritime surveillance ships arrived last year to press China's claim to the shoal, which is believed to be sitting atop undersea oil and gas reserves. The move was an example of China's increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea, something that is alarming the United States, Manila's longtime ally. Analysts say China's strategy is to slowly take possession of islands and outcrops in the South China Sea, using intimidation where necessary but avoiding any major confrontation. Its military might and economic dominance in the region mean it can push its weight around with little fear. Second Thomas Shoal and the nearby Spratly Islands lie about 120 miles (190 kilometers) from the western Philippine province of Palawan, and about 700 miles (more than 1,000 kilometers) from southern China. China's foreign ministry says Beijing has "indisputable sovereignty" over the shoal. The Sierra Madre is now effectively a shipwreck, but the Philippine military has not decommissioned it. This makes the ship an extension of the government and means any attack on the ship is tantamount to an assault against the Philippines. The Chinese ships are around 5 miles (8 kilometers) from the outpost, clearly visible to those on board. When Associated Press journalists and other members of the media were allowed to board the ship over the weekend, the marines went about their day, washing dishes and giving the visitors a short tour. The slow strain of Kid Rock's late 1990's song "Only God Knows" played from an old stereo set. "We're marines," Pelotera said in an interview. "We can adapt to life anywhere." Another marine, Cpl. Sheffrey Luna, said people should look beyond the ship's disrepair. "They should see the determination of the soldiers in it," he said. "If you're not determined here, where everything you see is water, you won't last long." In the last 15 years, the Sierra Madre has slowly crumbled, beaten by the sun, sea and storms. Its main deck, used as a helipad before, is now home to an upturned lifeboat and toppled iron poles. Doors and wooden scraps cover holes and weak deck sections that could collapse and hurl a marine down into the cavernous cargo hold. Its towering mast is heavily rusted and could be toppled by the next big storm. Three weeks ago, the Chinese succeeded in blocking for the first time a Philippine boat bringing troops and supplies to the Sierra Madre. Manila deployed a civilian boat last week with a fresh batch of marines and 10 tons of food. In a bid to draw global attention to what Philippine officials have called China's bullying tactics, they invited more than a dozen journalists, TV cameramen and photographers to come along on the 30-hour-plus journey from the Philippine mainland. Two Chinese coast guard ships tried to block the slow-moving vessel, with one cutting dangerously through the Philippine boat's path twice. The Chinese coast guard warned the boat by radio to turn back, saying it was illegally venturing into Chinese territory. The Chinese ships blew their horns continuously, but the boat maneuvered toward a shallow approach to the shoal dotted with submerged rocky outcrops, preventing the Chinese from continuing. Carl Thayer, a professor at the University of New South Wales and an expert on the dispute, said China is trying to wear the Philippines down. "China is mainly motivated to squelch the Philippines and its vocal and legal opposition to Chinese assertiveness, less this inspire other regional states to do the same," Thayer said. "Bit by bit, China hopes to condition regional states into accepting its hegemony." Philippine navy Lt. Ferdinand Gato, who led the resupply mission, smiled as the boat approached the Sierra Madre, with the outgoing marines, some of them sporting beards, waving and smiling on the deck. He had served as a gunnery officer of the warship during military campaigns against Muslim insurgents and Abu Sayyaf extremists in the mid-1990s. A regional military commander, Lt. Gen. Roy Deveraturda, awarded Pelotera and his men with bronze cross medals Monday for their work on the Sierra Madre. "You can now shave and have a haircut," he told the marines. He said he was heartened when he asked each of them if they were willing to return to the Philippine ship on the shoal. "They told me, 'anytime, sir.'" +3 Philippine Western Command Chief Lt. Gen. Roy Deveraturda, pins a Bronze Cross medal on Marine 1st Lt. Mike Pelotera, Officer-in-Charge of a contingent which was deployed for five months on board the dilapidated navy ship LT57 BRP Sierra Madre off the disputed Second Thomas Shoal, locally known as Ayungin Shoal, on the South China Sea Monday March 31, 2014 in Palawan western Philippines. On Saturday, China Coast Guard attempted to block the Philippine government vessel AM700 carrying fresh troops to relieved the nine marines as well as supplies, but the latter successfully managed to dock beside the ship housing the troops. (AP Photo/Bullit Marquez) +3 First Lt. Mike Pelotera of the Philippine Marines and fellow marines who were deployed five months ago on board the dilapidated navy ship LT57 BRP Sierra Madre off the disputed Second Thomas Shoal, locally known as Ayungin Shoal, on the South China Sea, arrive at a naval base in Palawan for awarding ceremony Monday, March 31, 2014 in southwestern Philippines. On Saturday, China Coast Guard attempted to block the Philippine government vessel AM700 carrying fresh troops to relieved the Nine marines as well as supplies, but the latter successfully managed to dock beside the ship housing the troops. (AP Photo/Bullit Marquez)     China's Dangerous South China Sea Strategy China has shifted from salami slicing to ramming in the South China Sea.   Having created a new ‘fact’ by shifting an oil rig into Vietnam’s proclaimed EEZ off the disputed Paracel Islands, China is ramming home the reality it’s making. First, last month, it rammed and sank a Vietnamese fishing boat. Now, recent TV footage broadcast by Vietnam shows another incident on 1 June with a Chinese ship ramming a Vietnamese coast guard ship. Reporting the vision, The Wall Street Journal commented: The latest apparent collision … suggests China won’t moderate its activities in contested areas of the South China Sea, despite a broadside of criticism from senior Australian, Japanese and US officials at the Shangri-La gathering of military leaders and defence ministers. It’s time to accept that what China is doing is a full and official expression of Chinese policy. We’re long past the point where the Chinese system should be given some sort of leave pass because of suggestions that China isn’t a unified actor—a perspective that argues China’s ‘crisis management’ machinery consists of the PLA creating the crisis and the Chinese Foreign Ministry handling the outcry. As a description, that view has its attractions, but as an explanation it absolves the China polity of responsibility for its rash, ramming policy. We should take China at its word, in proclaiming itself a big and important power; and such powers are responsible for what their military and their coast guards and their energy agencies do in the name of the state. If the South China Sea is Asia’s cauldron as well as Asia’s Mediterranean, as Robert D. Kaplan writes, then the heat in the cauldron is up again. Kaplan’s Cauldron book has been out for a few months, offering an excellent set up for what has happened in the last few weeks as Vietnam is rammed. In surveying the ASEAN players, Kaplan judged, ‘It’s all up to Vietnam’. He has a quote from “a top US official” on ASEAN’s positioning: “Malaysia is lying low, Brunei has solved its problem with China, Indonesia has no well-defined foreign policy on the subject, the Philippines has few cards to play despite that country’s ingenious boisterousness and incendiary statements, Singapore is capable but lacks size.” Good luck, Vietnam. On such matters turn to the master, Professor Carl Thayer, particularly his analysis of Vietnam’s strategy. ASEAN can’t abandon Vietnam to its fate the same way it stepped back from the Philippines last year. Accepting that ramming is official Chinese policy, endorsed from the top, what could ASEAN do? Southeast Asia needs to shift its response to China away from a futile policy of trying to negotiate an agreement with Beijing. Whether by slicing or ramming, China is out to create more ‘facts’ proclaiming its sovereignty. No Chinese appetite exists for any multilateral deal. Beijing thinks it erred in agreeing to the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and it’s not going to compound that mistake by agreeing to a Code of Conduct (COC). Step forward Carl Thayer with some thoughts on how ASEAN can change the game. In a paper to the recent Asia-Pacific Roundtable in Kuala Lumpur, the professor noted that the COC effort is a waste of ASEAN’s energy because China will make it unachievable: The COC process has led to divisions within ASEAN and divisions among ASEAN’s claimant states. China’s assertion of ‘indisputable sovereignty’ over the South China Sea and its recent unprecedented aggressive assertion of sovereignty utilising military vessels with unsheathed weapons and military aircraft, is now the major impediment to managing the maritime commons in the South China Sea. The Thayer solution is for ASEAN to turn away from the pointless effort with China and negotiate an agreement within ASEAN—a Code of Conduct for Southeast Asia’s Maritime Commons. The ten countries of Southeast Asia would resolve territorial and maritime disputes with each other, using as a model the recent agreement between Indonesia and the Philippines demarcating maritime boundaries in the Celebes and Mindanao seas. As Thayer notes, the new code would stand beside ASEAN’s Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (1971), the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (1976) and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (1995): The proposed COC for Southeast Asia’s Maritime Commons would enhance ASEAN’s unity and cohesion, promote regional autonomy and ASEAN’s centrality in the region’s security architecture. Just launching the process would change the tone of the argument, not least by putting ASEAN back together again. China will almost certainly keep ramming, but it would be running into an ASEAN response based on unity, negotiation and legal agreement. That would be a significant response to Chinese force. Beijing 'setting precedent' in South China Sea China has sent four more oil rigs into the South China Sea amid mounting regional tensions. Analyst Ian Storey tells DW Beijing is likely to deploy more rigs in the future as it intends to assert its "historic rights." China has sent four more oil rigs into the South China Sea in a bid to step up exploration for oil and gas in the in the potentially energy-rich waters. According to media reports, coordinates released by China's Maritime Safety Administration showed the Nanhai number 2 and 5 rigs had been deployed roughly between China's southern Guangdong province and the Pratas Islands, which are occupied by Taiwan. The Nanhai 4 rig was towed to waters close to the Chinese coast. Coordinates for the Nanhai 9, indicated the fourth rig was set to be positioned in the Gulf of Tonkin, an area disputed between China and Vietnam. Beijing's move comes less than two months after it deployed the giant Haiyang Shiyou 981 drilling platform in Vietnam's claimed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which led to violent anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam as well as accusations from both sides. Beijing claims almost the entire South China Sea, rejecting rival claims from Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. In a DW interview, Ian Storey, an analyst at the Singapore-based Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), tells DW the deployment of the rigs highlights Beijing's determination to assert jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea and that the international community only has very limited options to stop it. DW: Is China setting a precedent by sending more oil rigs? Ian Storey: Yes, it is and we can expect to see Beijing deploy more in the future. What message is China sending to neighboring countries? Vietnam and China have traded accusations, with each side claiming the other has engaged in aggressive behavior against its ships China is telling its neighbors that it intends to assert its so-called "historic rights" to maritime resources such as oil, gas and fish within the nine-dash line, a line that the majority of international legal experts regard as being incompatible with the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). How does the latest move fit in China's overall territorial strategy in the South China Sea? "Territory" means land - or in this case the disputed atolls - and what we are really talking about here is an attempt by China to assert jurisdictional rights in the maritime domain. What options do Southeast Asian nations have to counter China's moves? The Southeast Asian claimants in the South China Sea have very limited options. They certainly don't want to get into a shooting match with Beijing as the Chinese military, which has undergone a rapid program of modernization over the past two decades, would quickly prevail. Diplomatically they can demand, as Vietnam has, that China withdraws its rigs - but Beijing will simply ignore this request. DW RECOMMENDS China's RIMPAC debut 'unlikely to ease tensions' Seeking closer military ties, China will participate for the first time in the world's largest naval exercise. But the move is unlikely to restore trust between Beijing and its neighbors, analyst James Holmes tells DW. (23.06.2014) China accuses Vietnam of ramming its ships more than 1,400 times in disputed waters Japan-ASEAN ties 'may stabilize balance of power' China's maritime disputes: 'Fear, honor and interest' I think the best option for Hanoi is to mount a legal challenge to the deployment of the oil Haiyang Shiyou 981 rig at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in The Hague. However, even if ITLOS were to rule in Vietnam's favor, I think China would simply ignore it and absorb the costs to its reputation. What can the international community, and especially the United States, do to deescalate tensions? The options are limited. The US isn't going to risk a conflict with China over the presence of oil rigs in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, the international community should continue to raise its concerns with China that unilateral and provocative actions such as this risk undermining regional peace and stability. The international community should also continue to emphasize the importance of freedom of navigation, and that China should bring its claims into line with UNCLOS. At the end of the day though, this crisis will only be resolved when China withdraws the oil rig which it says it will do on August 15. A new crisis will emerge when the rig is deployed again into disputed waters, most likely into the Philippines' EEZ. That will really test the limits of the US-Philippine alliance.       China’s Information Warfare Campaign and the South China Sea: Bring It On! As its dispute with Vietnam continues, China is trying to have it both ways at the United Nations. The maritime confrontation between China and Vietnam over the placement of oil rig HYSY 981 in disputed waters in the South China Sea that began in early May is now entering its seventh week. On June 9 China unexpectedly opened a new front when Wang Min, Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations, presented Secretary General Ban Ki-moon a formal position paper on the dispute with a request that he circulate it to all 193 UN members. China’s action in internationalizing its dispute with Vietnam does not represent a change in its long-standing policy that maritime disputes can only be settled bilaterally through direct consultations and negotiation of the parties directly concerned. A day after China submitted its position paper, Hua Chunying, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that China rejected United Nations arbitration of its dispute with Vietnam. Why then did China take its dispute with Vietnam to the United Nations? In 2003 the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and Central Military Commission formally adopted the doctrine of “three warfares” (san zhong zhanfa). The three warfares doctrine is an essential element of information warfare. According to “China’s Three Warfares,” a 2012 study written by Timothy A. Walton for Delex Consulting, Studies and Analysis, China’s “three warfares” comprises three components: psychological warfare, media warfare, and legal warfare. It is the latter two components that shaped China’s position paper. Media warfare, according to Walton, is a strategy designed to influence international public opinion to build support for China and to dissuade an adversary from pursuing actions contrary to China’s interests. China’s position paper was sent to the United Nations in order to outflank Vietnam’s own propaganda effort and to isolate Vietnam. The vast majority of UN members have no direct interest in territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Many Southeast Asian states that hold concerns about China’s actions would shirk at being forced to take a public stand on the issue. Legal warfare, according to Walton, is a strategy to use China’s domestic and international law to claim the legal high ground to assert Chinese interests. China’s position paper is replete with selected references to international law to support China’s stance. Initially, China defended its placement of the oil rig by arguing that it was within China’s territorial waters. China noted that the HYSY 981 was located 17 nautical miles from Triton islet, the western most feature of the Paracel Islands. Under the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), territorial waters only extend 12 nautical miles from a state’s coastal baselines. China’s June 6 statement amended this error by claiming that the HYSY 981 was within China’s contiguous zone. This new claim, however, lacks legal foundation. According to UNCLOS the sole purpose of the contiguous zone is to enable a coastal state to  “exercise the control necessary to: (a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea; (b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea.” China has also attempted to obfuscate its dispute with Vietnam by advancing the argument that the location of HYSY 981 is closer to the Paracel Islands than to the Vietnamese coastline. China’s position paper argues, for example, that HYSY 981 was operating 17 nautical miles from both Triton islet and the baselines drawn around the Paracels and 133 to 156 nautical miles from Vietnam’s coastline. At the same time, China claims sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal, which is located closer to the Philippines than to the nearest Chinese land feature. Under international law, mere proximity is not sufficient to demonstrate sovereignty. China’s position paper to the UN actually undermines its use of legal warfare to advance its case. For example, China’s position paper states: The waters between China’s Xisha (Paracel) Islands and the coast of Vietnamese mainland are yet to be delimited. The two sides have not yet conducted delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf in these waters. Both sides are entitled to claim EEZ and continental shelf in accordance with the UNCLOS If this is the case, China should have followed the provisions of UNCLOS to deal with overlapping claims. Both China and Vietnam should have entered into provisional arrangements over the disputed area until agreement was reached on delimitation. During this period each side was enjoined from altering the status quo and from the threat or use of force. Clearly China’s placement of the oil rig in disputed waters violated international legal principles. But China’s position paper undermines its legal case by arguing that international law is irrelevant. The position paper states: However, these waters will never become Vietnam’s EEZ and continental shelf no matter which principle (on international law) is applied in the delimitation. China’s Ambassador to Australia, Ma Zhaozu, contributed to Beijing’s information warfare campaign by repeating the same argument in an op-ed article in The Australian on June 13. Ma argued that the disputed area has never been delimited and “no matter which principle [of international law] is applied these waters concerned will never become Vietnam’s part of EEZ and continental shelf.” China’s formal tabling of a position paper with the UN Secretary General should be taken up by members of the international community that are concerned about escalating tensions between China and Vietnam and their possible impact on regional security.  These states should argue that the matter be taken up by the Security Council. China should not be permitted to pursue information warfare in order to have it both ways – circulating a position paper to the UN in order to demonstrate the serious nature of its dispute with Vietnam and rejecting UN arbitration. The United States and Australia should press for a UN Security Council debate. Japan and other maritime powers with a stake in stability in the South China Sea should join in. China should be forced into the uncomfortable position of opposing any Security Council debate and thus scuttling its attempt to use UN for propaganda purposes, or to veto any resolution arising from a debate in the Security Council critical of China’s action in the South China Sea.         Does India Still Fear China's Growing Military Might? Almost a decade later, China's so-called "string of pearls" strategy has lost much of its shine. Why? At one point in the movie Beaches, Bette Midler's rather egotistical character C. C. Bloom inquires: "But enough about me, let's talk about you. What do you think of me?" In Beaches, it was all about C. C. Bloom. It's all about China in Asia these days. But enough about China and its dominance of the headlines. Let's talk about India. What does India think of China? One thing is clear: Indians do think about China, which has steadily expanded its strategic footprint in the Indian Ocean. And they worry about Asia's would-be Big Brother. Indian strategists see ulterior motives at work even in such nondescript endeavors such as the counterpiracy mission in the Gulf of Aden, where by most accounts, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) has been a valuable partner. Angst-ridden words have issued from New Delhi at times. Yet Indian leaders have modulated their rhetoric in recent years. They appear increasingly comfortable with the strategic outlook in South Asia. Anxieties have receded, though they haven't evanesced entirely and probably never will. And the leisurely pace (and fitful progress) of India's naval and military buildup belies any worried talk from officialdom. That's all good. All in all, New Delhi's more relaxed attitude toward Chinese naval expansion fits the strategic circumstances better than the anxieties of a decade ago. Then, Indians saw a Chinese naval juggernaut barging into their maritime environs, ringing the subcontinent with a network of hostile naval bases, and assuming command of Indian Ocean waters and skies—to the detriment of Indian primacy. Now, they seemingly understand that India commands enduring advantages in nearby seas and skies, never mind that it remains weaker than China by economic and military metrics; that Beijing has challenges aplenty to occupy its military resources in the China seas, and less to spare for South Asian adventures; and thus, that any truly menacing Chinese naval presence remains far off in the distance. Sobriety prevails. To track the evolution of India's posture, consider the Strange Case of China's String of Pearls. Ten years ago, the defense consultancy Booz Allen compiled a classified study for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Titled Energy Futures in Asia, the study garnered instant fame when it went public in 2005. Why? Because the study's framers hit upon a catchy phrase for Beijing's ambitions in the Indian Ocean. China, they opined, was pursuing a "string-of-pearls" strategy along the southern rimland. Its goal: to gain access to port facilities in countries such as Sri Lanka and Pakistan for merchantmen and PLA Navy warships. China courted diplomatic ties with South Asian governments, bankrolled seaport development at sites such as Gwadar in southwestern Pakistan, and proffered economic and infrastructure assistance of various types to sweeten bargains for access—and in turn for energy security. Such overtures appeared ominous to Indian strategists who worried that China would assemble a network of full-blown naval bases to project power into South Asia—much as Western sea powers did during the heyday of imperialism. Now, from a strictly Mahanian standpoint, this was cause for alarm. Naval sage Alfred Thayer Mahan made naval stations one of three pillars of sea power, something any seafaring state must obtain to carry on foreign commerce and command distant waters. Bases provide forward-deployed vessels and aircraft fuel, ammunition, and spare parts, execute repairs and upkeep, offer venues for crew rest and relaxation, you name it. It's hard to project—and sustain—power across thousands of miles without such outposts. The United States has ruled Asian seas and skies for seventy years, in large part because of bases such as Yokosuka and Sasebo in Japan. Indians fretted that a predatory China might replicate this feat in South Asia. China has grown far stronger since the Booz Allen report, yet India has mellowed. Why? Because some elemental facts about strategy, hardware, and tactics have sunk in—and prudence with them: - One, India is the home team in any Sino-Indian contest. India is closer to likely theaters of action, boasts more manpower and bases, and knows the physical and cultural terrain better than remote China does. It can deploy the logic of access denial to curb Chinese inroads in the Indian Ocean—much as China has employed this logic to inhibit America's freedom of action in East Asia. - Two, New Delhi isn't alone in the nautical competition. Strong seagoing states like Japan, Australia, and of course the United States have a stake in deterring Chinese aggression in India's backyard. Beijing's provocative actions in the East and South China seas supply an adhesive for a balancing coalition, portending what could come to be in South Asia. New Delhi can tap the potential for coalition-building, supplementing its strength with that of likeminded sea powers.

General view of the meeting between Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi (5th L) and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh (5th R) at the Government's Guesthouse, in Hanoi June 18, 2014. (Reuters) - China's top diplomat scolded Vietnamese officials during talks in Hanoi on Wednesday for "hyping up" a row over a Chinese oil rig drilling in disputed waters in the South China Sea, in tough comments that suggest relations will remain rocky. State Councilor Yang Jiechi also told his hosts that the rig's activities in waters also claimed by Vietnam were "completely legal", China's Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said at a daily briefing in Beijing. Yang, who outranks the country's foreign minister, made the remarks in a meeting with Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh. Before the visit, experts had said many obstacles remained to resolving one of the worst breakdowns in Sino-Vietnamese relations since the neighbours fought a brief war in 1979. Among them is Beijing's demand for compensation in the wake of anti-Chinese riots that erupted in Vietnam after the drilling platform was deployed on May 2.   China’s advance spurs Indonesian military shift Thursday, May 29, 2014 09:07 Indonesian navy commandos guard a beach in Nusa Dua, Bali, Indonesia during an economic summit. China’s intensifying move to assert claims over the South China Sea has given fresh impetus to a military buildup in Indonesia that will see its forces deployed with greater focus on external risks. After years of concentrating on separatist threats across an archipelago long enough to stretch from New York to Alaska, Indonesia plans to deploy attack helicopters to its islands at the southern end of the South China Sea and expand its naval power. The front-runner for July’s presidential election, Joko Widodo, aims to boost defense spending to 1.5 percent as a share of the economy, which is Southeast Asia’s largest. The strategy shift comes as China escalates disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam, fellow members of the Association of Southeast Asean Nations. China’s standoff with Vietnam over an oil rig this month followed its 2012 success in taking control of the Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines. “The focus in defense spending is moving to dealing with external threats,” said Tim Huxley, executive director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Singapore. “There is a concern from an Indonesian perspective that the South China Sea should not become a Chinese lake and that freedom of shipping should be maintained.” That is influencing Indonesia’s defense spending and procurement, he said. The military is about 40 percent of the way to developing a minimum-essential force, or MEF, by 2029, to guard its territory as it adds tanks, submarines, helicopters and jet fighters to its arsenal, Deputy Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin said in an interview in Jakarta. Under the MEF, the government is seeking to acquire 274 Navy ships, 10 fighter squadrons and 12 new diesel-electric submarines. “We’re part of maintaining regional stability and peace and to maintain that we must certainly have powers that support that regional strength,” Sjamsoeddin said. China’s map Indonesia has sought to stay out of its neighbors’ spats with China over the South China Sea, and is not an official claimant to areas in dispute. But in recent months it has said that China’s interpretation of its nine dash-line map -- the basis for its territorial claims -- is seeping into Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone. Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa said in an interview in April that he wanted an explanation of China’s map and asked the United Nations to help obtain clarity. Commodore Fahru Zaini, assistant deputy to the chief security minister for defense strategic doctrine, said in March that China’s map included an “arbitrary claim” to waters off the Natuna Islands in the Indonesian province of Riau. “This dispute will have a large impact on the security of Natuna waters,” he said, according to Antara News. 17,000 islands Indonesia has some 17,000 islands to police, stretched across 5,300 kilometers (3,293 miles) from east to west. The Malacca Strait that Indonesia shares with Malaysia is a key shipping lane that links the economies of countries such as India, China and Japan. “It’s the largest country in Southeast Asia and they want to play what they think is a corresponding role,” Richard Bitzinger, senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, said. “You’re not going to get that unless you develop a sizable, modern military, because at this point the military is pretty small potatoes.” Military spending increased to 81.96 trillion rupiah ($7.1 billion) in 2013 from 72.94 trillion rupiah in 2012, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. ‘Balanced force’ China’s defense budget will rise 12.2 percent this year to 808.2 billion yuan ($129 billion). President Xi Jinping has made a navy with longer reach a priority to boost China’s claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea. Despite being a maritime country, Indonesia seeks to build a “balanced force” between the army, the navy and the air force, Sjamsoeddin said in the March interview, as “eventually all battles end on land.” Indonesia, which is also spending on tanks, faced decades of internal discord in East Timor, an independent nation since 2002. Indonesia isn’t in an arms race and spends less than 1 percent of gross domestic product on defense, compared with 3 percent to 4 percent among other Asean nations, Sjamsoeddin said. If countries in the region have heavy tanks then Indonesia should have heavy tanks, said Sjamsoeddin, 61, adding some military equipment in use is older than he is. Natuna islands Indonesia will deploy four Boeing Apache attack helicopters to the Natuna Islands, IHS Jane’s reported on its website in March, citing General Budiman, the army’s chief of staff, as a pre-emptive measure against instability in the South China Sea. With China more assertive in the southern part of the South China Sea, “the Indonesian armed forces are strengthening their military presence on the Natuna Islands, and that includes preparing facilities on the Natuna Islands to accommodate jet fighters,” said Ian Storey, senior fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore. How far Indonesia pushes back against China may depend on the presidential election, with neither candidate detailing foreign policy goals so far. Widodo, who will face off against a former general, Prabowo Subianto, pledged to boost defense spending to 1.5 percent of GDP within five years, according to his policy paper. Spending is now 0.9 percent of GDP, according to Sipri. “There seems to be a commitment to increasing defense spending, increasing Indonesia’s overall military strength, more in accordance to what they see is a normal, large power in the region,” Bitzinger said. “They’re increasingly interested too in being able to be a modern military, to project power.”   CHINA UNDETERRED AND UNAPOLOGETIC China’s audacious land reclamation activities in the South China Sea are only the latest sign that its approach to settling maritime disputes with its neighbors has taken a sharp and dangerous turn. Although China began acting more assertively after perceiving its ascension to great power status in the wake of the global financial crisis, Beijing still felt compelled to justify its muscular movements in Asia as necessary reactions to the provocations of “troublemakers” in the region. Sure, China was standing strong, but arguably in response to the adventurism of others. It was more retaliatory than overtly belligerent. As Beijing made a habit of tempering and justifying its behavior, leading Western analysts developed terms like “reactive assertiveness” and described Chinese revisionism as “cautious and considered.” The seizureof Scarborough Reef in the South China Sea in April 2012 was explained as a compulsory response to the Philippines’ use of a naval vessel (rather than a coast guard ship) to interdict illegal Chinese fishermen. Similarly, China’s persistent incursions into Japanese-administered waters around the Senkaku Islands have been, according to Beijing, an obligatory answer to Tokyo’s purchase and “nationalization” of the islands in September 2012. Over the last eight months, however, China’s efforts to alter Asia’s geography have become unequivocally self-initiated. On the eve of Vice President Biden’s trip to Beijing last November, China announced the establishment of a new air defense identification zone in the East China Sea that extended over areas controlled by Japan and South Korea. This triggered widespread speculation about what had compelled Beijing to make this provocative move. Was it comments by the Japanese defense minister threatening to shoot down Chinese drones that wandered into Japanese airspace? It had to be something, right? The following month saw the promulgation of new fishing regulations with which China blessed itself with additional legal authorities in the South China Sea, further advancing its claims over hotly contested territories. Nowhere to be found, however, was the kind of defensive pretext that would have accompanied a similar step in years prior. Fast-forward to May 2014 and China sent a $1 billion oil rig into disputed waters off the coast of Vietnam. Desperate for an explanation, American commentators speculated that perhaps this was a retort to President Obama’s April trip to the region. But again, the Chinese offered no excuses, arguing instead that they were conducting normal economic activities in Chinese waters. And now comes land reclamation and the enlargement of small outcrops into islands that will likely be used for military activities. Not content to simply change facts on the ground, China is now changing the ground. In public, Chinese officials continue to deny this shift toward proactive assertiveness. Lieutenant General Wang Guanzhong told a capacity crowd at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on June 1 that, “China has never taken the first step to provoke troubles.” This rhetoric is likely to endure, but unfortunately for China’s propaganda machine, the track record of the last several months speaks for itself. So what’s changed? At least three elements explain this more assertive turn. First, the newly appointed President Xi Jinping is willing—and he hassaid as much—to be more forceful in achieving China’s territorial aims and to accept higher degrees of regional instability in the process. Second, China’s governing institutions have become more coherent through theconsolidation of maritime agencies and stronger coordination among its national security policymaking bodies. And finally, Chinese capability is growing in terms of both military and maritime capacity, as well as economic instruments like the deep water oil rig now floating off the coast of Vietnam. It’s actually not that complicated. China is changing the status quo in Asia because it wants to and thinks it can. Xi Jinping is a confident and powerful leader with a high-priority to-do list, and he’s increasingly enabled with greater capabilities and the institutions to deploy them. Mix in an economic slowdown and a healthy dose of nationalism and you have a recipe for revisionism. The result, however, is that American aspirations for China’s rise have gone terribly off-script. For decades, U.S. policy toward China has comprised a dual-track “hedging” strategy that includes engaging Beijing in an effort to induce China to support the existing international order, accompanied by a balancing component in which the United States and its allies deter Beijing from choosing an aggressive path. But now this strategy is coming apart at both ends: China neither accepts the territorial realities of Asia, nor is it deterred from coercive acts of revisionism. The real problem is that China’s bullying will endure as long as no one gets in the way. Why wouldn’t it? Beijing is pushing on an open door, incurring few tangible costs for its assertiveness and appearing to believe (perhaps rightly so) that it can ride out whatever regional criticism arises in response. Based on its track record of the last several years, it’s understandable that Beijing remains confident that most countries in the region will, at the end of the day, be unwilling to imperil their economic relationship with China. Alarm bells ought be ringing more loudly in Washington. Ultimately, it will be up to the United States to staunch China’s mounting revisionism. But this will first require a sober recognition that the old theories of how to shape China’s rise aren’t working. This is a difficult conversation to have in Washington because acknowledging Chinese behavior for what it is—undeterred and unapologetic assertiveness—will necessitate a more serious American response than we have seen to date. This doesn’t mean forgoing the cooperative elements of the “hedge” and committing to a highly competitive relationship with China. We’re not there yet. And besides, there’s a big difference between determining that China is presently undeterred versus determining that it is patently undeterrable. Before definitively drawing the latter conclusion, the immediate task for U.S. policymakers is to test the elasticity of Chinese decision-making. This calls for greater attention to cost-imposition strategies that attempt to shape the relative value of continued revisionism for China. Washington will have to explore the full potential range of economic, military, diplomatic and political points of leverage over Beijing (and there are many) to increase the costs of Chinese assertiveness, including areas that directly impinge on the interests of China’s leaders. The United States will also have to develop more tailored options for responding directly to maritime coercion in ways that repel specific acts of revisionism, rather than simply exacting lateral forms of punishment after the fact. China’s slow but steady revisions to the territorial status quo in Asia are not a legacy the Obama administration wants to leave behind. Being more proactive in stemming this behavior represents the principal challenge for Washington’s China policy today.     Image Credit: Flickr/ anthonylibrarian How Indonesia and the Philippines Solved Their Maritime Dispute The recent Indonesian-Philippine maritime pact offers important lessons for the South China Sea disputes. The recent conclusion of negotiations over maritime boundaries between Indonesia and the Philippines was a significant development for the two ASEAN member states. Their negotiation commenced in June 1994 and was dormant until 2003. The positive turn came amidst rising tensions in the South China Sea sparked by worsening disputes over competing maritime claims. The successful conclusion of the talks between Jakarta and Manila holds important lessons for all claimant states over disputed waters in the South China Sea. How it began In December 2003, I was assigned to jumpstart the maritime boundaries negotiation with the Philippines that was left dormant by both countries for almost a decade. I worked with my counterpart until 2010 when I left for Brussels, with my successor continuing the negotiation until it was completed and signed just last month on May 23, 2014 in Manila. Negotiations on maritime boundaries require patience and resolve. It is a long haul. Negotiation with the Philippines is particularly significant because Indonesia and the Philippines are two of the largest archipelagic countries in the world, initiators of the archipelagic legal principle, and member states of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Yet the Philippines was left with the historical issue of the rectangular line of the Treaty of Paris of 1898, which ended the Spanish-American War but left behind unclear territorial boundaries with Manila’s neighbors. Indonesia disputed the rectangular line of this Treaty on the ground that it did not conform with UNCLOS 1982, which Indonesia and the Philippines are parties to. It was a complicated issue for both countries because Indonesia rejected the claim. While my Philippine counterpart understood the reasons for our objection, they were under intense domestic pressure to somehow keep the Treaty of Paris on the table. The Philippines eventually aligned its position with UNCLOS 1982 and thus cleared the way for the conclusion of the maritime boundaries negotiation. The alignment of the Philippines position with UNCLOS 1982 can be seen as commendable state practice in international law. Negotiation over Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI) When maritime boundaries negotiations were going on between Indonesia and the Philippines as well as Indonesia and Malaysia, I was also involved in 2007 in the negotiation over the Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI) – a multilateral partnership of six countries – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands. Of these countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Timor-Leste had no maritime boundaries in 2007. Yet they managed to work together, even establishing a Secretariat, to address the urgent threats facing the coastal and marine resources of one of the most biologically diverse and ecologically rich regions on earth. On another front, in the busiest waters on earth – the Strait of Malacca and Singapore – the three littoral states of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have been able to work together in the areas with little maritime boundaries, all for the larger good. Two lessons for South China Sea claimants There are two important lessons arising from the negotiations between Indonesia and the Philippines over their bilateral maritime boundaries. Firstly, whether you like it or not, the current prevailing law to settle maritime boundaries is UNCLOS. This is true regardless of your historical record, even if it is 115 years old. If a rectangular line map from a century-old Treaty had to be aligned with UNCLOS, aligning a dash-line map that was created only in the mid-1940s with UNCLOS should be relatively problem-free. While there is a difference in shape between the rectangular line of the Treaty of Paris that the Philippines previously used with Indonesia, and the nine dash-line map that China currently bases its maritime claims in the South China Sea on, they share one similarity: both are unilateral expressions of claims that are not based on international law. The first Indonesia-Philippines maritime boundary signifies the emergence of a state practice whereby in a maritime boundary dispute a unilateral proclamation of maps will eventually be aligned with prevailing international law. Secondly, the claimants need not look far to see how countries in the region can work together for the larger interest over a large swath of waters devoid of maritime boundaries. The larger interest in CTI is the protection of the environment; in the Straits of Malacca, it is maritime security. They are public goods promoted and protected by countries regardless of the lack of maritime boundaries. These are concrete and excellent state practices in Southeast Asia. These are also clear examples demonstrating that we in Southeast Asia do have a culture of international law. Therefore, the recent escalations in the overlapping claims in the South China Sea are not the regional norm. They are an anomaly to the existing state practice in Southeast Asia and must be corrected. It is my conviction that all claimant states in the South China Sea, especially China, which is also a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, carry the moral, political, and legal responsibility of creating peace and stability in the world and are able to work together peacefully. Asia could very well be a world leader in conflict prevention and management of disputes regardless of the existence of boundaries. This can be done by putting the larger common interest and public goods, namely regional stability and security, over and above narrow national views. Are we up to the test?   http://

 

 

 

THE BRIDGE OF CAMELOT: KING ARTHUR

Statue of King Arthur,Hofkirche, Innsbruck, designed by Albrecht Dürer and cast byPeter Vischer the Elder, 1520s

Today the remains of the 13th Century settlement can be seen on both the mainland and the jagged coast at the site of what is reputedly King Arthur's birthplace. The new bridge will sit 28 metres higher than the current crossing and span some 72m across 'one of the most spectacular historic sites in Britain', according to English Heritage.   +7 Bridging the gap: Six designs, including this one from RFR and Jean-Francois Blassel, have been submitted for a new footbridge at Tintagel Castle, which is visited by more than 200,000 people every year +7 A view from a bridge: This entry from Dietmar Feichtinger Architects with Terrell is called Between Land and Sea and incorporates a bowed steel girder stressed into a horizontal position by stainless steel plates that are anchored to the slopes of the ravine +7 Sweeping landscape: This shortlisted bridge design from WilkinsonEyre with Atelier One is constructed from oak and stainless steel The six designs have shortlisted from 137 entries that were submitted from 27 countries. Among the finalists is Marks Barfield Architects Flint & Neill with their entry, the Bronze Blade, 'a bridge that is elegant, efficient, exhilarating and rooted in this spectacular place imbued with mystery.' Niall Mclaughlin's design with Price & Myers in Cornish granite 'is simple, durable and reinforces the place’s drama: a stone arch of Cornish granite springs across the chasm, seemingly tethering the island to the mainland.' Meanwhile RFR and Jean-Francois Blassel have come up with a design that, 'through the use of natural stone, the bridge takes its place within Tintagel’s historical layers.' The other shortlisted designs are by Wilkinson Eyre, with Atelier One, Dietmar Feichtinger and Terrel and Ney & Partners with William Matthews Associates. More than 200,000 tourists visit Tintagel Castle every year. The remains include a 13th century castle which was built by Richard, Earl of Cornwall, the brother of Henry III. The 12th century monk, Geoffrey of Monmouth, was the first to write down the name of Tintagel and identify it as the place where Arthur was conceived. According to his account, Arthur was conceived after a passionate episode between King Uther Pendragon and Lady Igraine. The legend states that Merlin disguised Uther as Gorlois, the husband of Igraine, who was away at war. Traditional: Marks Barfield Architects with Flint & Neill's design uses a beam bridge, the oldest and simplest of bridge structures +7 Breathtaking: This sweeping design from Ney & Partners with William Matthews Associates uses two independent cantilevers +7 Spectacular: This design by Niall McLaughlin Architects with Price & Myers proposes a stone arch made from Cornish granite Bridge for King Arthur will be across famous Tintagel Castle Later versions of the story state that Arthur was born at Tintagel in a cave and hidden by Merlin to protect him from the angered Gorlois. Tintagel is also the backdrop for another medieval story telling the tragic romance between the Cornish knight Tristan and the Irish princess Yseult. The shortlist is on display to the public at the tourist information centre in Tintagel, until 11 December. Subject to planning approval and consent, the bridge is scheduled for completion in 2019.   Statue of King Arthur,Hofkirche, Innsbruck, designed by Albrecht Dürer and cast byPeter Vischer the Elder, 1520s King Arthur of Britain, byHoward Pyle from The Story of King Arthur and His Knights. (1903)   King Arthur is a legendary British leader of the late 5th and early 6th centuries, who, according to medieval histories and romances, led the defence of Britain against Saxon invaders in the early 6th century. The details of Arthur's story are mainly composed of folklore and literary invention, and his historical existence is debated and disputed by modern historians.[2] The sparse historical background of Arthur is gleaned from various sources, including the Annales Cambriae, the Historia Brittonum, and the writings of Gildas. Arthur's name also occurs in early poetic sources such asY Gododdin.[3] Arthur is a central figure in the legends comprising the so-called Matter of Britain. The legendary Arthur developed as a figure of international interest largely through the popularity of Geoffrey of Monmouth's fanciful and imaginative 12th-century Historia Regum Britanniae (History of the Kings of Britain).[4] In some Welsh and Breton tales and poems that date from before this work, Arthur appears either as a great warrior defending Britain from human and supernatural enemies or as a magical figure of folklore, sometimes associated with the Welsh Otherworld, Annwn.[5] How much of Geoffrey's Historia (completed in 1138) was adapted from such earlier sources, rather than invented by Geoffrey himself, is unknown. Although the themes, events and characters of the Arthurian legend varied widely from text to text, and there is no one canonical version, Geoffrey's version of events often served as the starting point for later stories. Geoffrey depicted Arthur as a king of Britain who defeated the Saxons and established an empire over Britain, Ireland, Iceland, Norwayand Gaul. Many elements and incidents that are now an integral part of the Arthurian story appear in Geoffrey's Historia, including Arthur's father Uther Pendragon, the wizard Merlin, Arthur's wife Guinevere, the sword Excalibur, Arthur's conception at Tintagel, his final battle against Mordred at Camlann and final rest in Avalon. The 12th-century French writer Chrétien de Troyes, who added Lancelot and the Holy Grail to the story, began the genre of Arthurian romance that became a significant strand of medieval literature. In these French stories, the narrative focus often shifts from King Arthur himself to other characters, such as various Knights of the Round Table. Arthurian literature thrived during the Middle Ages but waned in the centuries that followed until it experienced a major resurgence in the 19th century. In the 21st century, the legend lives on, not only in literature but also in adaptations for theatre, film, television, comics and other media. Arthur as one of the Nine Worthies, bearing the coat of arms usually attributed to him: three gold crowns on blue.[6]Tapestry, c. 1385 The historical basis for the King Arthur legend has long been debated by scholars. One school of thought, citing entries in the Historia Brittonum (History of the Britons) and Annales Cambriae (Welsh Annals), sees Arthur as a genuine historical figure, a Romano-British leader who fought against the invading Anglo-Saxons sometime in the late 5th to early 6th century. The Historia Brittonum, a 9th-century Latin historical compilation attributed in some late manuscripts to a Welsh cleric called Nennius, contains the first datable mention of King Arthur, listing twelve battles that Arthur fought. These culminate in the Battle of Mons Badonicus, or Mount Badon, where he is said to have single-handedly killed 960 men. Recent studies, however, question the reliability of the Historia Brittonum.[7] The other text that seems to support the case for Arthur's historical existence is the 10th-century Annales Cambriae, which also link Arthur with the Battle of Mount Badon. The Annales date this battle to 516–518, and also mention theBattle of Camlann, in which Arthur and Medraut (Mordred) were both killed, dated to 537–539. These details have often been used to bolster confidence in the Historia's account and to confirm that Arthur really did fight at Mount Badon. Problems have been identified, however, with using this source to support the Historia Brittonum's account. The latest research shows that the Annales Cambriae was based on a chronicle begun in the late 8th century in Wales. Additionally, the complex textual history of the Annales Cambriae precludes any certainty that the Arthurian annals were added to it even that early. They were more likely added at some point in the 10th century and may never have existed in any earlier set of annals. The Mount Badon entry probably derived from the Historia Brittonum. This lack of convincing early evidence is the reason many recent historians exclude Arthur from their accounts of sub-Roman Britain. In the view of historian Thomas Charles-Edwards, "at this stage of the enquiry, one can only say that there may well have been an historical Arthur [but ...] the historian can as yet say nothing of value about him".[9] These modern admissions of ignorance are a relatively recent trend; earlier generations of historians were less sceptical. The historian John Morris made the putative reign of Arthur the organising principle of his history of sub-Roman Britain andIreland, The Age of Arthur (1973). Even so, he found little to say about a historical Arthur.   The 10th-century Annales Cambriae, as copied into a manuscript of c. 1100 Partly in reaction to such theories, another school of thought emerged which argued that Arthur had no historical existence at all. Morris's Age of Arthur prompted the archaeologist Nowell Myres to observe that "no figure on the borderline of history and mythology has wasted more of the historian's time".[11] Gildas' 6th-century polemic De Excidio et Conquestu Britanniae (On the Ruin and Conquest of Britain), written within living memory of Mount Badon, mentions the battle but does not mention Arthur.[12] Arthur is not mentioned in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle or named in any surviving manuscript written between 400 and 820.[13] He is absent from Bede's early-8th-century Ecclesiastical History of the English People, another major early source for post-Roman history that mentions Mount Badon.[14] The historian David Dumville has written: "I think we can dispose of him [Arthur] quite briefly. He owes his place in our history books to a 'no smoke without fire' school of thought ... The fact of the matter is that there is no historical evidence about Arthur; we must reject him from our histories and, above all, from the titles of our books."[15] Some scholars argue that Arthur was originally a fictional hero of folklore—or even a half-forgotten Celtic deity—who became credited with real deeds in the distant past. They cite parallels with figures such as the Kentish totemic horse-gods Hengest and Horsa, who later became historicised. Bede ascribed to these legendary figures a historical role in the 5th-century Anglo-Saxon conquest of eastern Britain.[16] It is not even certain that Arthur was considered a king in the early texts. Neither the Historia nor the Annales calls him "rex": the former calls him instead "dux bellorum" (leader of battles) and "miles" (soldier).[17] Historical documents for the post-Roman period are scarce, so a definitive answer to the question of Arthur's historical existence is unlikely. Sites and places have been identified as "Arthurian" since the 12th century,[18] but archaeology can confidently reveal names only through inscriptions found in securecontexts. The so-called "Arthur stone", discovered in 1998 among the ruins at Tintagel Castle in Cornwall in securely dated 6th-century contexts, created a brief stir but proved irrelevant.[19] Other inscriptional evidence for Arthur, including the Glastonbury cross, is tainted with the suggestion of forgery.[20]Although several historical figures have been proposed as the basis for Arthur,[21] no convincing evidence for these identifications has emerged. A facsimile page of Y Gododdin, one of the most famous early Welsh texts featuring Arthur, c. 1275 The earliest literary references to Arthur come from Welsh and Breton sources. There have been few attempts to define the nature and character of Arthur in the pre-Galfridian tradition as a whole, rather than in a single text or text/story-type. One recent academic survey that does attempt this, by Thomas Green, identifies three key strands to the portrayal of Arthur in this earliest material.[37] The first is that he was a peerless warrior who functioned as the monster-hunting protector of Britain from all internal and external threats. Some of these are human threats, such as the Saxons he fights in the Historia Brittonum, but the majority are supernatural, including giant cat-monsters, destructive divine boars,dragons, dogheads, giants and witches.[38] The second is that the pre-Galfridian Arthur was a figure of folklore (particularly topographic or onomastic folklore) and localised magical wonder-tales, the leader of a band of superhuman heroes who live in the wilds of the landscape.[39] The third and final strand is that the early Welsh Arthur had a close connection with the Welsh Otherworld, Annwn. On the one hand, he launches assaults on Otherworldly fortresses in search of treasure and frees their prisoners. On the other, his warband in the earliest sources includes former pagan gods, and his wife and his possessions are clearly Otherworldly in origin.[40] One of the most famous Welsh poetic references to Arthur comes in the collection of heroic death-songs known as Y Gododdin (The Gododdin), attributed to the 6th-century poet Aneirin. In one stanza, the bravery of a warrior who slew 300 enemies is praised, but it is then noted that despite this "he was no Arthur", that is to say his feats cannot compare to the valour of Arthur.[41] Y Gododdin is known only from a 13th-century manuscript, so it is impossible to determine whether this passage is original or a later interpolation, but John Koch's view that the passage dates from a 7th-century or earlier version is regarded as unproven; 9th- or 10th-century dates are often proposed for it.[42] Several poems attributed to Taliesin, a poet said to have lived in the 6th century, also refer to Arthur, although these all probably date from between the 8th and 12th centuries.[43] They include "Kadeir Teyrnon" ("The Chair of the Prince"),[44] which refers to "Arthur the Blessed", "Preiddeu Annwn" ("The Spoils of Annwn"),[45] which recounts an expedition of Arthur to the Otherworld, and "Marwnat vthyr pen[dragon]" ("The Elegy of Uther Pen[dragon]"),[46] which refers to Arthur's valour and is suggestive of a father-son relationship for Arthur and Uther that pre-dates Geoffrey of Monmouth. Culhwch entering Arthur's Court in the Welsh tale Culhwch and Olwen, 1881 Other early Welsh Arthurian texts include a poem found in the Black Book of Carmarthen, "Pa gur yv y porthaur?" ("What man is the gatekeeper?").[47] This takes the form of a dialogue between Arthur and the gatekeeper of a fortress he wishes to enter, in which Arthur recounts the names and deeds of himself and his men, notably Cei (Kay) and Bedwyr (Bedivere). The Welsh prose tale Culhwch and Olwen (c. 1100), included in the modern Mabinogion collection, has a much longer list of more than 200 of Arthur's men, though Cei and Bedwyr again take a central place. The story as a whole tells of Arthur helping his kinsman Culhwch win the hand of Olwen, daughter of Ysbaddaden Chief-Giant, by completing a series of apparently impossible tasks, including the hunt for the great semi-divine boar Twrch Trwyth. The 9th-century Historia Brittonum also refers to this tale, with the boar there named Troy(n)t.[48] Finally, Arthur is mentioned numerous times in the Welsh Triads, a collection of short summaries of Welsh tradition and legend which are classified into groups of three linked characters or episodes in order to assist recall. The later manuscripts of the Triads are partly derivative from Geoffrey of Monmouth and later continental traditions, but the earliest ones show no such influence and are usually agreed to refer to pre-existing Welsh traditions. Even in these, however, Arthur's court has started to embody legendary Britain as a whole, with "Arthur's Court" sometimes substituted for "The Island of Britain" in the formula "Three XXX of the Island of Britain".[49] While it is not clear from the Historia Brittonum and the Annales Cambriae that Arthur was even considered a king, by the time Culhwch and Olwen and the Triads were written he had becomePenteyrnedd yr Ynys hon, "Chief of the Lords of this Island", the overlord of Wales, Cornwall and the North.[50] In addition to these pre-Galfridian Welsh poems and tales, Arthur appears in some other early Latin texts besides the Historia Brittonum and the Annales Cambriae. In particular, Arthur features in a number of well-known vitae ("Lives") of post-Roman saints, none of which are now generally considered to be reliable historical sources (the earliest probably dates from the 11th century).[51] According to the Life of Saint Gildas, written in the early 12th century byCaradoc of Llancarfan, Arthur is said to have killed Gildas' brother Hueil and to have rescued his wife Gwenhwyfar from Glastonbury.[52] In the Life of SaintCadoc, written around 1100 or a little before by Lifris of Llancarfan, the saint gives protection to a man who killed three of Arthur's soldiers, and Arthur demands a herd of cattle as wergeld for his men. Cadoc delivers them as demanded, but when Arthur takes possession of the animals, they turn into bundles of ferns.[53] Similar incidents are described in the medieval biographies of Carannog, Padarn and Eufflam, probably written around the 12th century. A less obviously legendary account of Arthur appears in the Legenda Sancti Goeznovii, which is often claimed to date from the early 11th century although the earliest manuscript of this text dates from the 15th century.[54] Also important are the references to Arthur in William of Malmesbury's De Gestis Regum Anglorum and Herman's De Miraculis Sanctae Mariae Laudensis, which together provide the first certain evidence for a belief that Arthur was not actually dead and would at some point return, a theme that is often revisited in post-Galfridian folklore.[55] Geoffrey of Monmouth Mordred, Arthur's final foe according to Geoffrey of Monmouth, illustrated by H. J. Ford for Andrew Lang's King Arthur: The Tales of the Round Table, 1902 The first narrative account of Arthur's life is found in Geoffrey of Monmouth's Latin work Historia Regum Britanniae(History of the Kings of Britain).[56] This work, completed c. 1138, is an imaginative and fanciful account of British kings from the legendary Trojan exile Brutus to the 7th-century Welsh king Cadwallader. Geoffrey places Arthur in the same post-Roman period as do Historia Brittonum and Annales Cambriae. He incorporates Arthur's father, Uther Pendragon, his magician advisor Merlin, and the story of Arthur's conception, in which Uther, disguised as his enemyGorlois by Merlin's magic, sleeps with Gorlois's wife Igerna at Tintagel, and she conceives Arthur. On Uther's death, the fifteen-year-old Arthur succeeds him as King of Britain and fights a series of battles, similar to those in the Historia Brittonum, culminating in the Battle of Bath. He then defeats the Picts and Scots before creating an Arthurian empire through his conquests of Ireland, Iceland and the Orkney Islands. After twelve years of peace, Arthur sets out to expand his empire once more, taking control of Norway, Denmark and Gaul. Gaul is still held by the Roman Empire when it is conquered, and Arthur's victory naturally leads to a further confrontation between his empire and Rome's. Arthur and his warriors, including Kaius (Kay), Beduerus (Bedivere) and Gualguanus (Gawain), defeat the Roman emperor Lucius Tiberius in Gaul but, as he prepares to march on Rome, Arthur hears that his nephew Modredus (Mordred)—whom he had left in charge of Britain—has married his wife Guenhuuara (Guinevere) and seized the throne. Arthur returns to Britain and defeats and kills Modredus on the river Camblam in Cornwall, but he is mortally wounded. He hands the crown to his kinsman Constantine and is taken to the isle of Avalon to be healed of his wounds, never to be seen again.     Merlin the wizard, c. 1300 How much of this narrative was Geoffrey's own invention is open to debate. Certainly, Geoffrey seems to have made use of the list of Arthur's twelve battles against the Saxons found in the 9th-century Historia Brittonum, along with the battle of Camlann from the Annales Cambriae and the idea that Arthur was still alive.[59] Arthur's personal status as the king of all Britain would also seem to be borrowed from pre-Galfridian tradition, being found in Culhwch and Olwen, the Triads and the Saints' Lives.[60] In addition, many of the elements that Monmouth's King Arthur includes are strong parallels to "Culhwch and Olwen." The motifs and themes of loyalty, honor, giants, gift giving, wife-stealing, and magical creatures are prominent in both stories. Furthermore, Monmouth derived many of his character's names from "Culhwch and Olwen"; Sir Kay comes from "Kai"; Sir Bedivere is derived from "Bedwyr"; and lastly Sir Gawain is "Gwalchmei" in Welsh. Also, the heroines of both tales have similar names: the meaning of Guinever is "White Phantom", while Olwen equates with "of the white track."[61] Finally, Geoffrey borrowed many of the names for Arthur's possessions, close family and companions from the pre-Galfridian Welsh tradition, including Kaius (Cei), Beduerus (Bedwyr), Guenhuuara (Gwenhwyfar), Uther (Uthyr) and perhaps also Caliburnus (Caledfwlch), the latter becoming Excalibur in subsequent Arthurian tales.[62] However, while names, key events and titles may have been borrowed, Brynley Roberts has argued that "the Arthurian section is Geoffrey's literary creation and it owes nothing to prior narrative."[63] So, for instance, the Welsh Medraut is made the villainous Modredus by Geoffrey, but there is no trace of such a negative character for this figure in Welsh sources until the 16th century.[64] There have been relatively few modern attempts to challenge this notion that theHistoria Regum Britanniae is primarily Geoffrey's own work, with scholarly opinion often echoing William of Newburgh's late-12th-century comment that Geoffrey "made up" his narrative, perhaps through an "inordinate love of lying".[65] Geoffrey Ashe is one dissenter from this view, believing that Geoffrey's narrative is partially derived from a lost source telling of the deeds of a 5th-century British king named Riotamus, this figure being the original Arthur, although historians and Celticists have been reluctant to follow Ashe in his conclusions.[66] Whatever his sources may have been, the immense popularity of Geoffrey's Historia Regum Britanniae cannot be denied. Well over 200 manuscript copies of Geoffrey's Latin work are known to have survived, and this does not include translations into other languages.[67] Thus, for example, around 60 manuscripts are extant containing Welsh-language versions of the Historia, the earliest of which were created in the 13th century; the old notion that some of these Welsh versions actually underlie Geoffrey's Historia, advanced by antiquarians such as the 18th-century Lewis Morris, has long since been discounted in academic circles.[68] As a result of this popularity, Geoffrey's Historia Regum Britanniae was enormously influential on the later medieval development of the Arthurian legend. While it was by no means the only creative force behind Arthurian romance, many of its elements were borrowed and developed (e.g., Merlin and the final fate of Arthur), and it provided the historical framework into which the romancers' tales of magical and wonderful adventures were inserted.[69] Romance traditions During the 12th century, Arthur's character began to be marginalised by the accretion of "Arthurian" side-stories such as that of Tristan and Iseult. John William Waterhouse, 1916 The popularity of Geoffrey's Historia and its other derivative works (such as Wace's Roman de Brut) is generally agreed to be an important factor in explaining the appearance of significant numbers of new Arthurian works in continental Europe during the 12th and 13th centuries, particularly in France.[70] It was not, however, the only Arthurian influence on the developing "Matter of Britain". There is clear evidence for a knowledge of Arthur and Arthurian tales on the Continent before Geoffrey's work became widely known (see for example, the Modena Archivolt),[71] as well as for the use of "Celtic" names and stories not found in Geoffrey's Historia in the Arthurian romances.[72] From the perspective of Arthur, perhaps the most significant effect of this great outpouring of new Arthurian story was on the role of the king himself: much of this 12th-century and later Arthurian literature centres less on Arthur himself than on characters such as Lancelotand Guinevere, Percival, Galahad, Gawain, and Tristan and Iseult. Whereas Arthur is very much at the centre of the pre-Galfridian material and Geoffrey's Historia itself, in the romances he is rapidly sidelined.[73] His character also alters significantly. In both the earliest materials and Geoffrey he is a great and ferocious warrior, who laughs as he personally slaughters witches and giants and takes a leading role in all military campaigns,[74] whereas in the continental romances he becomes the roi fainéant, the "do-nothing king", whose "inactivity and acquiescence constituted a central flaw in his otherwise ideal society".[75] Arthur's role in these works is frequently that of a wise, dignified, even-tempered, somewhat bland, and occasionally feeble monarch. So, he simply turns pale and silent when he learns of Lancelot's affair with Guinevere in the Mort Artu, whilst in Chrétien de Troyes's Yvain, the Knight of the Lion he is unable to stay awake after a feast and has to retire for a nap.[76] Nonetheless, as Norris J. Lacy has observed, whatever his faults and frailties may be in these Arthurian romances, "his prestige is never—or almost never—compromised by his personal weaknesses ... his authority and glory remain intact."[77] Arthur (top centre) in an illustration to the Middle Englishpoem Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, late 14th century Arthur and his retinue appear in some of the Lais of Marie de France,[78] but it was the work of another French poet, Chrétien de Troyes, that had the greatest influence with regard to the above development of the character of Arthur and his legend.[79] Chrétien wrote five Arthurian romances between c. 1170 and c. 1190. Erec and Enide and Cligès are tales of courtly love with Arthur's court as their backdrop, demonstrating the shift away from the heroic world of the Welsh and Galfridian Arthur, while Yvain, the Knight of the Lion features Yvain and Gawain in a supernatural adventure, with Arthur very much on the sidelines and weakened. However, the most significant for the development of the Arthurian legend are Lancelot, the Knight of the Cart, which introduces Lancelot and his adulterous relationship with Arthur's queen (Guinevere), extending and popularizing the recurring theme of Arthur as a cuckold, and Perceval, the Story of the Grail, which introduces the Holy Grail and the Fisher King and which again sees Arthur having a much reduced role.[80] Chrétien was thus "instrumental both in the elaboration of the Arthurian legend and in the establishment of the ideal form for the diffusion of that legend",[81] and much of what came after him in terms of the portrayal of Arthur and his world built upon the foundations he had laid. Perceval, although unfinished, was particularly popular: four separate continuations of the poem appeared over the next half century, with the notion of the Grail and its quest being developed by other writers such as Robert de Boron, a fact that helped accelerate the decline of Arthur in continental romance.[82]Similarly, Lancelot and his cuckolding of Arthur with Guinevere became one of the classic motifs of the Arthurian legend, although the Lancelot of the prose Lancelot (c. 1225) and later texts was a combination of Chrétien's character and that of Ulrich von Zatzikhoven's Lanzelet.[83] Chrétien's work even appears to feed back into Welsh Arthurian literature, with the result that the romance Arthur began to replace the heroic, active Arthur in Welsh literary tradition.[84] Particularly significant in this development were the three Welsh Arthurian romances, which are closely similar to those of Chrétien, albeit with some significant differences: Owain, or the Lady of the Fountain is related to Chrétien's Yvain;Geraint and Enid, to Erec and Enide; and Peredur son of Efrawg, to Perceval.[85] The Round Table experience a vision of the Holy Grail. From a 15th-century French manuscript. Up to c. 1210, continental Arthurian romance was expressed primarily through poetry; after this date the tales began to be told in prose. The most significant of these 13th-century prose romances was the Vulgate Cycle(also known as the Lancelot-Grail Cycle), a series of five Middle French prose works written in the first half of that century.[86] These works were the Estoire del Saint Grail, the Estoire de Merlin, the Lancelot propre (or Prose Lancelot, which made up half the entire Vulgate Cycle on its own), the Queste del Saint Graal and theMort Artu, which combine to form the first coherent version of the entire Arthurian legend. The cycle continued the trend towards reducing the role played by Arthur in his own legend, partly through the introduction of the character of Galahad and an expansion of the role of Merlin. It also made Mordred the result of an incestuous relationship between Arthur and his sister and established the role of Camelot, first mentioned in passing in Chrétien's Lancelot, as Arthur's primary court.[87] This series of texts was quickly followed by the Post-Vulgate Cycle (c. 1230–40), of which the Suite du Merlin is a part, which greatly reduced the importance of Lancelot's affair with Guinevere but continued to sideline Arthur, now in order to focus more on the Grail quest.[86] As such, Arthur became even more of a relatively minor character in these French prose romances; in the Vulgate itself he only figures significantly in theEstoire de Merlin and the Mort Artu. During this period, Arthur was made one of the Nine Worthies, a group of three pagan, three Jewish and three Christian exemplars of chivalry. The Worthies were first listed in Jacques de Longuyon's Voeux du Paon in 1312, and subsequently became a common subject in literature and art.[88] The development of the medieval Arthurian cycle and the character of the "Arthur of romance" culminated in Le Morte d'Arthur, Thomas Malory's retelling of the entire legend in a single work in English in the late 15th century. Malory based his book—originally titled The Whole Book of King Arthur and of His Noble Knights of the Round Table—on the various previous romance versions, in particular the Vulgate Cycle, and appears to have aimed at creating a comprehensive and authoritative collection of Arthurian stories.[89] Perhaps as a result of this, and the fact that Le Morte D'Arthur was one of the earliest printed books in England, published by William Caxton in 1485, most later Arthurian works are derivative of Malory's.

FACT OR FICTION: DID THE LEGENDARY KING ARTHUR REALLY EXIST?     Clive Owen portrayed the legendary leader in the 2004 film, King Arthur, but whether he really existed is still a matter of debate among historians Both the Historia Brittonum (History of the Britons) and Annales Cambriae (Welsh Annals), state that Arthur was a genuine historical figure, a Romano-British leader who fought against the invading Anglo-Saxons in the late 5th to early 6th century. The 9th Century Historia Brittonum lists 12 battles that King Arthur fought, including the Battle of Mons Badonicus, where he is said to have killed 960 men - but some scholars have dismissed the reliability of this text. Tintangel Castle is the legendary birthplace of King Arthur. As according to the legend, archaeologists have discovered this was the fortified home of the ruler of Cornwall, in about 500AD. In 1998, a slate engraved with ‘Artognou’ was discovered there. Silchester was the site of King Arthur’s coronation and was able to continuously defend itself against the Saxons. The Roman name for Silchester was Calleba – similar to the name given to Arthur’s sword, Excalibur. One of Arthur’s celebrated battles against the Saxons was fought at Chester or the City of the Legion, as it was known in the Dark Ages. Archaeologists have discovered evidence of battle at nearby Heronbridge, and recent excavations show the amphitheatre was fortified during this period, with a shrine to a Christian martyr at its centre. This fits a description of Arthur’s Round Table, which was said to be a very large structure, seating 1,600 of his warriors. During the 1960s, excavations by Philip Rahtz showed someone had inhabited the top of Glastonbury Tor during the so-called Arthurian period. According to the legends, this could have been King Meluas, who abducted Queen Guinevere to his castle at Glastonbury, or Arthur’s warrior Gwynn ap Nudd, who was banished from his Palace on the Tor. In 1191, monks at Glastonbury Abbey found the body of a gigantic man, wounded several times in the head. The bones of his wife and a tress of her golden hair were also in the oak coffin. Found with the burial was an ancient lead cross, inscribed with ‘Here lies buried the famous king Arthur with Guinevere his second wife, in the Isle of Avalon’. In 1962, archaeological evidence was found supporting the story that a tomb within the ancient church had been disturbed centuries previously. The whereabouts of the cross and bones are no longer known. However, Arthur is not mentioned in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle or any documents written between 400 and 820 - including Bede's Ecclesiastical History of the English People   His is among the most enduring ­legends in our island’s history. King Arthur, the gallant warrior who gathered his knights around the  Round Table at Camelot and rallied Christian Britons against the invading pagan Saxons, has always been an enigma. But now historians believe they have uncovered the precise location of Arthur’s stronghold, finally solving the riddle of whether the Round Table really existed. And far from pinpointing a piece of furniture, they claim the ‘table’ was in fact the circular space inside a former Roman amphitheatre. +2 Round table? An artist's impression of Chester's Amphitheatre, where historians now believe King Arthur may have held court The experts believe that Camelot could in fact have been Chester Amphitheatre, a huge stone-and-wood structure capable of holding up to 10,000 people. They say that Arthur would have reinforced the building’s 40ft walls to create an imposing and well fortified base. The king’s regional noblemen would have sat in the central arena’s front row, with lower-ranked subjects in the outer stone benches. Arthur has been the subject of much historical debate, but many  scholars believe him to have been a 5th or 6th Century leader. The legend links him to 12 major battles fought over 40 years from the Scottish Borders to the West Country. One of the principal victories was said to have been at Chester. +2 King Arthur, portrayed here by Clive Owen on film in 2004, held court at Camelot - which historians now believe may have been in Chester Rather than create a purpose-built Camelot, historian Chris Gidlow says Arthur would have logically chosen a structure left by the Romans. ‘The first accounts of the Round Table show that it was nothing like a dining table but was a venue for upwards of 1,000 people at a time,’ he said. ‘And we know that one of Arthur’s two main battles was fought at a town referred to as the City of the Legions. There were only two places with this title. One was St Albans, but the location of the other has remained a mystery.’ Researchers, who will reveal their evidence in a television documentary this month, say the recent discovery at the amphitheatre of an execution stone and a wooden memorial to Christian martyrs suggests the missing city is Chester. Mr Gidlow said: ‘In the 6th Century, a monk named Gildas, who wrote the earliest account of Arthur’s life, referred both to the City of the Legions and to a martyr’s shrine within it. 'That is the clincher. The discovery of the shrine within the amphitheatre means that Chester was the site of Arthur’s court – and his legendary Round Table.’ For centuries, historians have believed that King Arthur’s Camelot was Tintagel Castle in Cornwall, but new research has cast serious doubts on this theory. Historian Graham Robb has spent years studying Celtic pathways across the country and now believes he has stumbled upon the site of Camelot at the end of a quiet cul-de-sac in Brookfield Road, Wigan. The leafy dead-end street may have once been the site of King Arthur’s infamous castle and court, and home to the legendary Knights Of The Round Table. +8 Residents of Brookfield Road, road sign pictured, said they were 'stunned' to discover their lane has been named as the epicentre of Arthurian legend Residents in the village of Standish near Wigan, have been left stunned after the discovery that their lane has been named as the epicentre of Arthurian legend. +8 Historian Graham Robb believes King Arthur's, illustration pictured, Camelot was built at the end of Brookfield Road, Standish in Wigan Claims that the small road could have once been the realm of the legendary king and his men have appeared in Robb's latest book. In his work 'The Ancient Paths: Discovering the Lost Map of Celtic Europe' he theorises that the area in Standish was ‘significant’ as it was the meeting place of two major Celtic pathways. He added the crossing pathways, on what is now the cul-de-sac ‘have an astonishing power to illuminate the long-buried past by revealing the location of the legendary court of King Arthur’. Dr Robb said the ‘intersection lies in the Wigan suburb of Standish’ adding ‘to be precise, the point of intersection is at the end of a cul-de-sac running off Old Pepper Lane where a tracks leads to a woodland’. He has however laughed off the local reaction because he believes Camelot is entirely based on a myth and never really existed. He said: 'I was talking about how intersecting Celtic roads of the time can become significant to history and myth. 'It is like theorising you have found Hogwarts - you can't do it because it never existed in the first place.' In his book, Graham Robb wrote that the now defunct Camelot theme park sits just a few miles away from the cul de sac. He writes: 'The place where 'Camelot' stands empty was once the edge of Martin Mere, the largest freshwater lake in England. 'A local legend claimed that this was the lake into whose waters, in what sounds like an act of ritual deposition, the sword Excalibur was thrown. In view of the unusual preponderance of modal points in the environs of the vanished lake, this now looks more plausible than ever.' The cul-de-sac, Brookfield Road, is near Martin Mere, the largest freshwater lake in England, into which local legend claims the famous Arthurian sword Excalibur was thrown. This aerial view shows Old Pepper Lane in Standish on the left, the Brookfield Road cul-de-sac in the centre, leading to a stretch of woodland on the right where Robb believes Camelot was built Robb claims the precise location of Camelot was at the end of Brookfield Road, in the village of Standish, marked right. The cul-de-sac is near Martin Mere, marked left, the lake in which local legend claims the sword Excalibur was thrown Robb added that the crossing pathways, pictured, on what is now the cul-de-sac 'have an astonishing power to illuminate the long-buried past by revealing the location of the legendary court of King Arthur.' The intersection lies at the end of a cul-de-sac off Old Pepper Lane where a tracks leads to woodland, pictured Robb said his geographical research makes it ‘more plausible than ever’ that the small corner of Wigan would be the location of the mythical Camelot. His claims have now been taken up by a local campaign group trying to stop a new link road being built in the area. A council want to build a new highway across a patch of woodland at Almond Brook, at the end of Brookfield Road. A spokesman for Stop Almond Brook Link Road said the new revelations means the area should preserved and the planned new highway scrapped. +8 Arthurian legend claims Arthur was the son and heir of King Uther Pendragon, and was born on Castle Island in Tintagel, North Cornwall. The remains of Tintagel Castle is pictured A lake on the woodland where King Arthur's Camelot was thought to have been built. King Arthur was a legendary British leader of the late 5th and early 6th centuries who according to histories and romances, led the defence of Britain against invaders in the early 6th century He said: ‘We have lots of issues with this link road, including it going past school playing fields which could harm the health of pupils and destroying wildlife habitats. ‘But we didn’t think for one minute that the route would also run through what could be Camelot. ‘This site needs a lot more investigation. We just need a white knight to come along and help us save it from development. ‘We found this new theory while researching our campaign but it does tie in with local legends about King Arthur. ‘Wigan Council should be embracing its links with the distant past and not ripping it up.’ King Arthur was a legendary British leader of the late 5th and early 6th centuries who according to histories and romances, led the defence of Britain against invaders in the early 6th century. THE LEGEND OF KING ARTHUR: FROM CORNWALL TO WIGAN King Arthur was a legendary British leader of the late 5th and early 6th centuries who according to histories and romances, led the defence of Britain against invaders in the early 6th century. However, the King Arthur that many people are familiar with today – thanks to TV shows, films and stage productions – is said to be a combination of many different myths and legends that have developed over the last 1,000 years. Arthurian legend claims Arthur was the son and heir of King Uther Pendragon, and was believed to have born on Castle Island in Tintagel, North Cornwall. A sorcerer called Merlin is said to have taken a sword called Excalibur from the so-called Lady of the Lake for King Uther, but upon the King’s death, he placed the sword in a stone. Merlin stated that ‘he who draws the sword from the stone, he shall be king.’ After the King's death, Arthur is said to have pulled Merlin’s Excalibur sword from this stone, proving his right to the throne. The legend doesn’t specify exactly where this lake was and there is a debate on whether it was Martin Mere in Lancashire, the Lily Ponds at Bosherston, or Dozmary Pool on the edge of Bodmin Moor. The latter is closest to the supposed birthplace in Cornwall. Legend continues that during his reign, in the kingdom of Camelot, King Arthur met with his knights at a Round Table, journeyed after the Holy Grail and fought a number of battles using the infamous sword. During the Battle of Camlann, in approximately 537, King Arthur was killed and his body was sent to the Isle of Avalon. Historians believe this area was Glastonbury and the Somerset levels. Later, legend expanded the story and claimed upon Arthur's death, the sword was returned to the Lady of the Lake. Early written accounts of the Arthurian story appeared in 1130 in Geoffrey of Monmouth's History of the Kings of Britain where he claimed Merlin had the 15-year-old Arthur crowned at nearby Silchester, in Reading. The first mention of the Round Table, however, was in Robert Wace's Roman de Brut in 1155. This book claimed the round table was a wedding gift to Arthur from Guinevere's father, Leodegrance and is now believed to be hung in the Great Hall in Winchester (pictured above). Arthur was said to have sat his knights on the round table so that none was ever in a position of power of importance. The details of Arthur’s story are mainly composed of folklore and literary invention, and his historical existence is debated and disputed by modern historians. His famous Knights have been linked to the area before - a now defunct Camelot theme park was located nearby for years, based near Martin Mere. Resident Arthur Lowe, 72, said: 'I suppose it's quite funny I share King Arthur's name but I was named after my dad - not a king.' Tony Stanley, 69, who has lived in the cul-de-sac for over 40 years, added: 'I just started laughing when I heard about it. It's a really industrial area and there used to be loads of pits round here so to think they're now making this claim is just ridiculous. +8 The first mention of the Round Table was in 1155. This book claimed the round table was a wedding gift to Arthur from Guinevere's father, Leodegrance and is now believed to be hung in the Great Hall in Winchester, pictured 'At first, I thought someone was having a joke for April Fools Day but then I realised it's still March. Dr Robb was born in Manchester and educated at the Royal Grammar School Worcester and Exeter College, Oxford, where he studied Modern Languages. In his The Discovery of Middle Earth: Mapping the Lost World of the Celts book, Robb proposed that the ancient Celts organised their territories, determined the locations of settlements and battles, and set the trajectories of tribal migrations by establishing a network of solstice lines based on an extension of the Greek system of klimata. The evidence included artistic geometries, road surveying, centuriations and other archaeologically attested pre-Roman alignments.