Pentagon releases secret footage of swarm drones being launched from fighter jets - and is planning 'Avatar' self flying planes


  • Friday, April 12, 2019






    Strategy to Defeat China in The SCS


    The air campaign in Desert Storm was a watershed for air power. It demonstrated the effectiveness of precision munitions, marked a high water point for electronic warfare and introduced radar stealth in a decisive manner. It also established a template for the application of air power that has taken root in Air Force culture and remains firmly established a quarter century later.



    At the outset of the war sink all  surface Chinese ships and submarine, after radar and SAM coastal batteries have been neutralized using our airforce stealth bombers and jet fighters.





    In the context of a Sino-American war, the United States could try to take China’s greatest national strength—its export-oriented, booming economic-growth model—and transform it into a major military weakness. To do so, the United States would implement a naval blockade of China that attempted to choke off most of China’s maritime trade. Under the right conditions, the United States might be able to secure victory by debilitating China’s economy severely enough to bring it to the negotiating table.




    Yet until recently, a blockade strategy was largely overlooked, perhaps because economic warfare strategies seem inherently misguided given the close commercial ties between China and the United States. But if a serious conflict between the two nations erupted, then their immediate security interests would quickly override their trade interdependence and wreak enormous economic damage on both sides, regardless of whether a blockade were employed.




    Even if a blockade is never executed, its viability would still impact American and Chinese policies for deterrence reasons. The United States’ regional strategy is predicated on the belief that a favorable military balance deters attempts to change the status quo by force, thus reassuring allies and upholding strategic stability. The viability of a blockade influences this calculus, and can accordingly affect American and Chinese actions—both military and nonmilitary—that are based on perceptions of it. If a naval blockade is a feasible strategy, it strengthens the American system of deterrence and dilutes any potential attempts by China to coerce the United States or its allies. Moreover, if a blockade’s viability can be clearly enunciated, it would also enhance crisis stability and dampen the prospects of escalation due to misunderstandings—on either side—about the regional balance of power. In short, as Elbridge Colby put it: “the old saw remains true, that the best way to avoid war is to prepare for it.”




    While a blockade is not a priori impossible or irrelevant in any situation, it is also not a ready tool in the American arsenal and would be feasible mainly within certain boundaries. Most importantly, many commentators miss the fact that a blockade is a context-dependent strategy, one that crucially depends on the regional environment.








    Earlier this year, a Chinese frigate locked weapon-targeting radar on a Japanese destroyer near the Senkaku Islands. Both Japan and China lay territorial claims to these uninhabited islands, which are close to both Okinawa and Taiwan. This is one of many territorial disputes that China has in the South and East China Seas.




    Needless to say, there was no escalation in this particular instance: the Japanese destroyer did not respond, and the only volleys fired were of a diplomatic nature. But what if things shake out differently next time? It is not hard to imagine such a scenario spinning out of control and leading to a shooting war. What would the U.S. do if this led to a larger regional war?




    Under this and many other scenarios, the U.S. would be obligated to defend its allies. One way in which it might do this would be through a blockade of Chinese maritime traffic by U.S. forces, with the explicit support of nations that control key international straits, including Indonesia and Malaysia. Though it would be costly and risky, a blockade could prove decisive. T.X. Hammes and Sean Mirski contend that in the right circumstances, particularly a limited war of long duration, blockade could be a war winning strategy.




    At the same time, however, a blockade would not be without its pitfalls. It would take a long time to enact. It would have to balance interdiction of oil imports against economic exports. And a blockading nation would also need to consider how to “hold the line” to prevent China from achieving its goal (in the above example, securing sea control of the Senkaku Island) while a blockade was taking effect.




    Given its potential utility and also its possible downsides, decision makers and theater commanders must understand how a blockade of China would actually work and the precise conditions under which it holds promise.




    What Should Be Blockaded?




    When considering a blockade, the first question is: what commodity is to be targeted? One obvious option is to target everything. NWP 1-14, the Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, states that the belligerent right of blockade allows interdiction of all vessels and aircraft, regardless of cargo, crossing an exclusion zone. Blockades established to starve a civilian populace are illegal, but a reasonable case could be made that China’s agricultural resources and medical capabilities can provide for the civil population even during a blockade.




    But just because an option is legal, it is not necessarily wise. Total blockades, such as the Union blockade of the Confederacy or the German U-Boat campaign against Great Britain, are difficult and expensive. It is more efficient to target specific commodities. For instance, during World War II, the United States used both the strategic air campaign in Europe and the submarine campaign in the Pacific to effectively target Germany’s and Japan’s oil infrastructures. Such a strategy would prove effective in a long term conflict with China.




    Indeed, much as it was for Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, oil is China’s Achilles’ heel. Chinese domestic oil production supplies only 40% of peacetime consumption and demand continues to increase, even during periods of zero or negative growth in exports (see 2001 and 2009). Another advantage of targeting oil is the ease of discrimination. An oil tanker is a unique vessel, easing the blockaders’ burden when identifying and prioritizing targets. Significant smuggling of oil in other types of ships is impractical. In addition, China would have a hard time importing enough oil over land due to difficult terrain, underdeveloped pipelines and competition for Russian oil.




    However, China recognizes its reliance on foreign oil and has taken steps to reduce its vulnerability to supply disruptions. Specifically, China has established a robust strategic oil reserve. China’s 2011 strategic oil reserve was sufficient to supply 100% of domestic consumption (factoring in domestic production) for 25 days without rationing. Improvements to this reserve are planned to more than double its duration by 2020, even factoring in an increase in Chinese oil demand.




    The effect of a war on China’s demand for oil must also be considered. China uses oil mostly for transportation, so given that a war would reduce Chinese exports (it would not, after all, continue trading with the United States and Japan), the demand for oil to transport goods would go down. Overland transport mitigates China’s reliance on maritime oil, even though it provides only a small share of China’s total need. A blockader also must be wary of resale of neutral oil that is allowed past the blockade, requiring a strong coalition to surround China. Rationing, while it would be unpopular with the Chinese people, would further reduce demand for oil.



    China’s export income of $2 trillion would be hard hit simply by declaring such a blockade (in addition to the immediate loss of revenue from U.S. ports closing their doors to China). This immediate loss to China could provide the catalyst to end hostilities, and if China made a poor transition to a wartime economy, a disgruntled middle class could cost the Chinese Communist Party dearly, thus reducing the perceived value of a war.



    Still, the Chinese economy has proven resilient in times of reduced trade by replacing export income with internal investment and stimulus. If China determined that the war objectives were worth the loss of exports, effectively managed nationalism could,in the short term buoy popular will during the immediate economic hardship. As enthusiasm for the war effort faded, governmental control over the economy could then be leveraged to spur domestic development for long term maintenance of the economy (investment in fixed capital contributes 75% more to China’s economy than exports and government stimulus could increase this more).




    But because the shift to domestic development would still require oil, the operational emphasis of a blockade should be on stopping oil while interdicting targets of opportunity when practicable. Periodically interdicting a container ship gives credence to the export blockade and drives away customers, while the main effort still focuses on compromising China’s oil situation. After all, WWII submariners still sank troop ships; they just sank the tankers first.




    How Should a Blockade Be Conducted?




    An ideal blockade of China would use multiple layers, with each layer having a different purpose. These layers should include (1) a distant conventional blockade focused on chokepoints of sea lines of communications to China; (2) a close, unconventional maritime engagement zone, and (3) diplomatic engagement to embargo points of embarkation.




    The most critical part of the blockade is the first: control of key chokepoints using conventional forces. The focal point of this blockade would be the Strait of Malacca and nearby archipelagic straits through Indonesia. These locations derive the protection of international law and the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, which states that that belligerents cannot operate in neutral waters. Consequently, to make the blockade legal, the countries bordering the Strait of Malacca must explicitly support a blockade, becoming belligerents themselves. While failing to gain Malaysia’s support would be a surmountable challenge – it might simply move the blockade 12 miles outside the straits into international waters – Indonesia’s support will make or break a blockade. Its archipelagic sea lanes (at least four basic routes) provide several corridors for blockade runners exploiting innocent passage. Without Indonesian support, only a United Nations Security Council Resolution allows closure of these sea lanes, and China’s Security Council veto would never allow that.




    Even setting legalities aside, a blockade of the Strait of Malacca would be a complicated undertaking. Given the vast quantity of traffic that transits these chokepoints—much of it bound for allied or neutral countries—traditional methods of visit and search are challenging. Approximately 165 ships of all types transit the Strait of Malacca each day, of which 52 are oil tankers. A blockader would need to investigate all appropriate ships, evaluate whether they were blockade runners, and seize those that were. As many as thirteen warships would be required to enforce an oil blockade using traditional methods of visit and search . This number does not allow for force protection, replacements for material failures or prize crews. Additional ships would have to guard other passages such as the Lombok/Makassar straits. Increased insurance rates and risk-averse shippers would reduce that number of tankers destined for China; however, China’s large national fleet and other Chinese owned merchants would still sail, and China’s significant cash reserves could supplant traditional insurers. As such, the operational commander would still need to dedicate a squadron of significant size to blockade, revealing a major opportunity cost.




    It is possible to reduce this footprint if some measures are taken during peacetime (there is no time like the present). Specific examples include development of procedures, relationships and technologies to establish a Navicert system for shipping and stand up land-based Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) teams from the Coast Guard and land forces. A Navicert process is a prescreening of traffic at the port of embarkation previously used by the British during their blockades of Germany, which could make blockade inspections more efficient. Combining a Navicert process with an electronic system such as the Automatic Identification System (an automated data system installed on all ships 300 tons or larger that reports a wealth of information) increases the potential for success.  A commander can use land based VBSS teams augmented with drones, helicopters and small boats to supplement warships in critical chokepoints, allowing precious destroyers and cruisers to assist in other efforts. These capabilities would be difficult to develop “on the fly” in wartime, so capabilities and relationships should be fostered now to improve their effectiveness at the onset of hostilities.


    Pentagon's micro-drones can be launched from F-16 and F A/18 fighter jets 
  • Can also be launched by hurling from ground, or with slingshot-like device
  • The drones gain situational awareness to find each other and create swarm
  • Avatar project would turn older jets into autonomous planes  
A highly secretive Pentagon organization is experimenting with 'micro-drones' which could one day take to the sky like a like a swarm of robotic locusts.
The experiments led by the Strategic Capabilities Office were conducted in Alaska last summer, according to The Washington Post, during which the tiny drones were launched from fighter jets.
After launch, the 3-D printed micro-drones break free of a canister and seek each other out to create a swarm. Pentagon releases video showing micro-drones dropping from F-15

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SWARMING MICRO-DRONES 

The micro-drones have inch-wide propellers, and can be launched from the flare dispensers of F-16 and F/A-18 fighter jets.
After launch, they descend in a parachute-equipped canister and then break free.
Once free, the drones gain situational awareness and locate other drones to create a swarm.
The program costs roughly $20 million, and is named after Perdix, a character in Greek mythology who was turned into a partridge by Athena.
The Alaska exercise put the drones through 150 tests, 72 of which were from fighter jets.
These micro-drones can also be launched from the ground by hand, or using a sling-shot like device.
It's been said they can be used for surveillance and as a way of confusing enemy forces.
While the SCO can't release specific details on the drones, it's been said they can be used for surveillance and as a way of confusing enemy forces.
The micro-drones have inch-wide propellers, and can be launched from the flare dispensers of F-16 and F/A-18 fighter jets.
In the footage reviewed by The Washington Post, a micro-UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) is shot out from an F-16 moving 430 mph.
This happens at 2,000 feet above the surface Earth, and the drone descends inside a parachute-equipped canister.
After a moment, the small drone which weighs roughly a pound bursts free and its swings spread out to catch the wind. 
According to The Washington Post, these tiny craft have situational awareness, allowing them to move together in swarms after they've been released from the canister.
The program costs roughly $20 million, and is named after Perdix, a character in Greek mythology who was turned into a partridge by Athena.
The Alaska exercise put the drones through 150 tests, 72 of which were from fighter jets.These micro-drones can also be launched from the ground by hand, or using a sling-shot like device.
In an interview with The Washington Post, physicist and director of SCO William Roper said last summer's tests proved the swarming capabilities of the micro-drones.
Roper also revealed the Pentagon's plans for a project called Avatar, which aims to pair 'fifth-generation' fighter jets with unmanned versions of older jets.
A highly secretive Pentagon organization is experimenting with ¿micro-drones¿ which could one day take to the sky like a like a swarm of robotic locusts. The experiments led by the Strategic Capabilities Office were conducted in Alaska last summer, during which the tiny drones were launched from fighter jets
A highly secretive Pentagon organization is experimenting with 'micro-drones' which could one day take to the sky like a like a swarm of robotic locusts. The experiments led by the Strategic Capabilities Office were conducted in Alaska last summer, during which the tiny drones were launched from fighter jets
This would couple high-tech jets like the F-22 Raptor and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter with jets like the F-16 Fighting Falcon or F/A-18 Hornet in a concept known as the 'Loyal Wingman' in the Air Force.
In the program, which was previously called 'Skyborg,' older jets would be flown autonomously for the first time, allowing them to act with less direction from the pilot in the manned jet. 
In a speech this past February, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter discussed some of the proposed 2017 budget, including a call for $902 million for the SCO.
Carter described the many ways the SCO is exploring autonomous technologies, hinting at the capabilities of the swarming micro-drones.
'In the air, they develop micro-drones that are really fast, really resistant,' Carter said.
'They can fly through heavy winds and be kicked out the back of a fighter jet moving at Mach 0.9, like they did during an operational exercise in Alaska last year, or they can be thrown into the air by a soldier in the middle of the Iraqi desert.'
While the SCO can¿t release specific details on the drones, it¿s been said they can be used for surveillance and as a way of confusing enemy forces. The micro-drones have inch-wide propellers, and can be launched from the flare dispensers of F-16 and F/A-18 fighter jets
The micro-drones have inch-wide propellers, and can be launched from the flare dispensers of F-16 (pictured above) and F/A-18 fighter jets. These micro-drones can also be launched from the ground by hand, or using a sling-shot like device
While the SCO can't release specific details on the drones, it's been said they can be used for surveillance and as a way of confusing enemy forces. The micro-drones have inch-wide propellers, and can be launched from the flare dispensers of F-16 and F/A-18 fighter jets
He also went on to say that this technology, along with a similar fleet of autonomous boats and other projects are just a few of the many systems the SCO is now working on.
'For example, the micro-drones, I mentioned a moment ago, use a lot of commercial components and are actually 3-D printed and the boats build on some of the same artificial intelligence algorithms that long-ago and in a much more primitive form were on the Mars lander.'  
These types of UAVs have been tested since 2014, but the Alaska experiment during the military exercise Northern Edge, they reached a new milestone.
Physicist and director of SCO William Roper, pictured above, said last summer¿s tests proved swarming capabilities of the micro-drones. These types of UAVs have been tested since 2014, but the Alaska experiment during the military exercise Northern Edge, they reached a new milestone
Physicist and director of SCO William Roper, pictured above, said last summer's tests proved swarming capabilities of the micro-drones. These types of UAVs have been tested since 2014, but the Alaska experiment during the military exercise Northern Edge, they reached a new milestone

SELF-LEARNING ROBOT SWARM BOATS 

The robotic swarms work like a school of fish, or flock of birds.
Using a neural network as a 'living brain,' the robots can interact with each other, working from a set of simple instructions.
Each boat only acknowledges its neighbour, and will work together for monitoring, navigation, aggregation, and dispersion.
After tests in a simulate environment, the 'fittest' robots, those who have the most successful behaviours, are tested in a real world setting.